

By the Same Author

HITLER AND I

GERMANY TOMORROW

by

OTTO STRASSER



Translated from the German by
EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

Power, like a desolating pestilence,
Pollutes whate'er it touches; and obedience,
Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth,
Makes slaves of men, and of the human frame
A mechanised automaton.

— SHELLEY, *Queen Mab*

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BIOGRAPHICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

OTTO STRASSER, a Bavarian, was born on September 10, 1897. His brother, Gregor, five years older, was killed by Goering's orders (Hitler accepted responsibility) in the Blood Bath of June 30, 1934. Both brothers were Nazis at a time when the National Socialists were really socialists as well as nationalists, and they remained socialists after Hitler had dropped this part of his creed. That was the untoward fact that led to Gregor's murder. Five years before this Otto had broken with Hitler; on May 10, 1933, he left Germany to become a refugee in Austria, subsequently in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and France (where he now resides).

Otto Strasser's ideas on German Socialism were incorporated in a book *Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus* published in 1931, second edition 1936. The bulk of it appears in Part Three of the present volume, being essential to the author's presentation of Germany Tomorrow. Part One, 'Is Revolution in Germany Possible?', and Part Two 'Liquidation of the War (Peace Proposals of Tomorrow's Germany)', were written at the turn of the year, i.e. well after the outbreak of the war, expressly for the present book. All three parts, and the Appendix matter, speak for themselves, so nothing more need be said about bibliography.

Otto Strasser played an active part in the previous war, joining the Bavarian army as a volunteer on August 2, 1914, rising from the ranks to become a

PRELIMINARY NOTE

lieutenant, decorated, and twice wounded. He took the degree of Doctor of Law in 1921, and for a time held an official post under the Weimar Republic. Then he was appointed legal adviser to an industrial concern in Berlin. For some years after this he was editor-in-chief (during the gradual rise of the Nazis) of most of the North German periodicals of the National Socialist Party. After his breach with Hitler he founded the Black Front, an anti-Hitler organization, which aims also (and chiefly) at promoting 'German Socialism'. It plays a considerable part in this book, and will perhaps play a still more considerable part in Germany Tomorrow, and in Europe the Day after Tomorrow. Since in Germany Today assassination has a recognized function in politics, it is not surprising that even as a refugee Otto Strasser has had several 'narrow squeaks'. But he still continues his reasoned (and bloodless) campaign for promoting the downfall of the Hitler System and the upbuilding of German Socialism — a campaign with which *Germany Tomorrow* has much to do. The book is addressed, not only to Germans, but to all 'Good Europeans'.

EDEN AND CEDAR PAUL

London

May Day, 1940

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P R E F A C E

THIS war is the inevitable outcome of the Hitler System. For the last ten years, and especially since Hitler seized power, I have been indefatigably trying to demonstrate as much in countless publications.

Regard for historical truth makes it essential to state that Hitler's seizure of power was part of that Germano-European development to which I have given the general name of the 'German Revolution', by which I mean the birth of a new order in politics, economics, and civilization. Issuing from Germany, this will to a greater or less extent transform the established European system even as, at their respective times, did the English Revolution and the French.

From this outlook we can understand the otherwise inexplicable mistakes and shortcomings of the statesmen of other lands, beginning with Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, going on to Hodscha and Beck, next to François Poncet and Nevile Henderson, and last of all to the men of the 'Peace of Munich' — since had it not been for these mistakes and shortcomings Adolf Hitler would never have been able to carry out his work of destruction — and even so we have to recognize that such work of destruction has been and is the necessary prelude to the upbuilding of the new order which is the meaning of this, as of every revolution. Contemplation based upon a study of the philosophy of history does much to lessen the blame attaching to the German people for the Hitler System and the war to which it has given rise. The

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Germans may have to shoulder the greater share of blame, but their share is only a part of the general load which must be assigned in varying degrees to the policies of other countries than Germany.

More important, however, than the assignment of multifarious shares of blame to Hitler and his war (an assignment justified and restricted by our historical outlook), is the no less inevitable certainty we derive that Hitler and his war will be defeated.

And how?

Certainly if we regard, as I and my friends do, the Hitler System (and for our purposes that includes the civil war in Europe which the Hitler System has brought about) as a necessary stage in the transition from a decaying old order to an evolving new one, as the epoch during which effete forms are being swept away — why then we shall have the joyful conviction that such an epoch of destruction cannot possibly be lasting. It will come to an end as soon as the old and the worm-eaten have really been swept away, and as soon as the new and the young that are everywhere germinating beneath the surface of things come clearly to light.

From this outlook Hitler is really no more than the testing 'hammer of God' with which men and things are tapped to discover whether life persists in them, whether they still have faith, will, strength, and the power of renewal. Where these good qualities are lacking, the hammer breaks the old forms to powder — even as, in scripture, the tree which bore no fruit was to be ruthlessly cut down. But when fruit-bearing is still possible, the will to and the power for renewal will

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infallibly spring up after the hard testing of these blows; under new forms, but in the old spirit, the spirit of the 'Mothers' in *Faust* which dwells in the depths of our soul, the soul of every human being, the soul of every nation, the soul of the West. Revolutionary in form, conservative in substance, is the policy that derives from such a method of contemplation.

Victory over Hitler and his system of destruction, victory in this war over the powers of destruction, is no less certain than were the coming of Hitler and this war; and both spring from the necessity and the nature of the 'German Revolution'.

Three questions necessarily arise for consideration after such an outlook has been defined, three questions which must be answered before we can be sure that we have more to guide us than mere faith in the future; three questions which the non-German world above all will put, in order to learn what lies behind this contention, and what the foreign world has to expect from our 'German Revolution':

- (1) Is a revolution at all possible in Germany?
- (2) What would the ideas of such a 'German Revolution' be as regards the liquidation of the war?
- (3) What sort of aspect would the new order have in Germany?

The importance of these questions, and the warrant we have for putting them, are all the more palpable because war prevails, so that men are summoned to battle, wish to know and are entitled to know what they are fighting for and why they are making sacrifices.

The aim of this book is to answer these three questions,

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to answer them as accurately as possible and with a full sense of responsibility imposed on us by the deadly earnestness of our time.

It arises from the circumstances of the case that the answers to questions (1) and (2) must 'date', must arise out of the extant military situation; while nevertheless they also arise out of the spirit of the new order, which forces itself into the light independently of Hitler's regime and Hitler's war.

Nothing can prove this more convincingly than the fact that the plans for the new order in Germany were drafted years before the Hitler System, and therefore longer still before the war. They were drafted in their main lines, and constituted the written program of a large and active political movement in the Reich.

As Douglas Reed shows in his instructive book *Nemesis?*, these main lines formed the substantial content of the so-called Hanover Program which was adopted in 1925 as the program of the North German group of the National Socialists, and became the cause of my breach with Hitler. After 1930 it was the official program of the Black Front, and was published as such in 1931 in the first edition of my own book *Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus*.

The most important chapters of that book comprise Part Three of the present work, and show the latter to be in no sense a degenerate form of concession to the present war and its expected result.

To emphasize this I have deliberately left standing certain sections that have grown obsolete during the last ten years, sections which the reader can correct for himself in the light of the new formulations in Part Two.

P R E F A C E

For it seemed and seems to me of outstanding importance that the scheme for a new order in Germany came into being independently of the Hitler system and the present war, for it was and is the program of a young, active and growing political movement in the Reich. Not hatred of Hitler, nor the sourness of a refugee, nor a dread of military defeat, nor concessions to the western powers, guided my pen when I helped to draft that program. In 1930 none of those influences were at work — to say little of the fact that since then I have done my utmost to hinder such considerations from modifying my political thought and will.

This suffices to show that the plan for a new order in Germany issued from the sources of the German nature and of German history, and is therefore deeply based upon the national spirit, is essentially permanent — whereas dictatorship from without is nothing but a makeshift which every national wind can puff away. If, therefore, it should prove practicable to combine the safety of Europe with the reconstruction of Germany, then every true-hearted German nationalist must gladly accept the outcome.

This book is intended to provide the foundations for such a testing-time, penned by one who is convinced that German national security and European collaboration, far from being mutually exclusive, tend to favour one another.

OTTO STRASSER

Penned in Exile
Easter 1940

PART ONE

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY
POSSIBLE?

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

THE revolutionary character of the general situation in Germany is unquestionable. Indeed, the foundation of the historical and political views that have guided the thoughts and actions of myself and my friends is the fact that revolution has been going on in Germany for the last twenty years — a revolution of which the Hitler System is but one phase, the phase of destruction.

The caption of this Part One of my book can, therefore, relate only to the tactical question whether revolution is possible within the framework of the German Revolution at large, to the question whether the Hitler System can be overthrown, thereby initiating the last phase of the German Revolution. That phase will consist of the establishment of a new order.

Since the question 'Can the Hitler System be overthrown by an internal movement in Germany?' is thus tactical, it follows that the answer must likewise be mainly determined by tactical considerations. Such events as Hitler's striking successes in Scandinavia and the Balkans (successes indirectly due to his ally Stalin's victory in Finland) have a great influence upon the most immediate general outlooks, and are of decisive importance as regards the factor of time.

Having made this proviso, which must constantly be borne in mind, we discover that the following general features will help us to answer the question under discussion:

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(1) The prevailing atmosphere, by which I mean the masses' widespread dissatisfaction with the present regime — a dissatisfaction for which (as usual) numerous, and often conflicting, causes can be found.

(2) The existence of a minority of persons prepared to take action, a minority willing and able at the appropriate moment to transform passive discontent into political action, much as a spark occurs to discharge electrical tensions that have accumulated beyond a certain amount.

(3) A paralysis of will within the system, or, rather, a paralysis of will among the active defenders of the system, because their self-confidence has been undermined, because their assurance of victory has waned, because they have lost discipline and resolution. In other words, for revolution to be possible a considerable number of those who wield the forces of the dominant system must have come to sympathize with the aims of the revolutionists, or must at least have ceased active opposition to these aims.

If we proceed to enquire how far, in the Germany of 1940, these fundamental prerequisites of a revolution exist, it can be unambiguously shown that the general atmosphere discloses all the features which make revolution possible.

So widespread, so virulent is the discontent of the German people with the dominant Hitler System (varying, of course, with the successes or failures of the system) that the enumeration of proofs would almost be superfluous. All the same, I shall give a summary of them, to avert the danger of that self-deception which makes dispassionateness impossible.

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Surely one of the most convincing proofs is the fact that the Hitler System, after being in power for seven years, must still rely upon the detestable terrorist methods of the Gestapo and the concentration camps? Hereby Goebbels' chatter about 'popular support' of the Nazi regime is as flatly contradicted as by the ever more extensive gagging of the press, the wireless, and any other means by which the opinions of the German people seek expression.

Precise investigations have shown that the number of Germans who have pined for a longer or shorter time in concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons during the seven years of the Hitler regime totals more than two millions. Official statistics show, then, that over ten million Germans (if we add the dependents of the victims) have been so actively antagonistic to Hitler as to make personal acquaintance with his penal system. Nay more, many, many thousands of Germans have been put to death by their rulers, or, let us say bluntly, have been murdered.

Today these facts should be all the more emphatically proclaimed because they show, not only the profound hatred of the German people for the Hitler System, but also that an enormous part of the German people was actively fighting that system at a time when the foreign world was still associating with Hitler on friendly terms. What this signifies is that the same enormous part of the German people stands in the present 'European Civil War' on the side of Europe against the dictatorship of Hitler and Stalin, thus representing, not only a latent revolutionary force, but also a direct military force — inasmuch as the majority of the two million Germans

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who are or have been under the Hitlerian harrow are Germans of military age.

Less manifest but not less effective than the open antagonism of the victims past and present in Hitler's concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons, is the voiceless discontent of the millions of those who are apathetic in political matters. Among these, who consist in very large measure of women, it is not so much political or philosophical considerations which bring them into opposition with the system, as the experiences of daily life. The luxury of the Hitler bosses, the increasing brutalization of youth, the fall in real wages, the rise in prices (which largely takes the form of a deterioration in quality), the more and more oppressive demands enforced upon the manual workers and anyone else willing to make sacrifices, the mendacity of propaganda, the alarming effects of the reign of terror, religious persecution, etc., were already operative before the war to intensify discontent with the system among those who are apathetic in politics and constitute something like 70% of every nation. Hitler and Goebbels knew this just as well as Himmler and Goering. But whereas the two latter believed that the difficulty could be overcome by tightening up the screw-press of the terror, the two former were shrewd enough, in accordance with the old Roman principle of 'bread and circuses', to replace the lacking bread (read 'butter') by an abundance of circuses (read 'spectacular successes').

This made it essential for Hitler to gain spectacular national successes, and the statesmen of the West were too dull-witted to perceive that every time Hitler made a coup on or across the frontier — as by his military

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occupation of the Rhineland, his march into Austria, his conquest of Sudetenland, his annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, and his regaining of Memel — this was also a slap in the face for the opposition on the home front, made possible only by foreign aid. Each national success secured temporarily for Hitler the approval of the apathetic masses, who considered it a proof of 'the Leader's genius', and a reward to themselves for the sacrifices they were making.

But since the outbreak of war this stimulus has lost its savour, for the coming of war gave the lie to the piping of Goebbels during the last few years, to the unceasing declaration that 'the Leader will do it all without war'. During the first six or eight weeks after the declaration, the Germans were, in fact, panic-stricken. Then came recovery, thanks to the prompt victories in Poland, and the inertia of the western powers, especially as concerned their airforces. Still, the recovery of morale has by no means been complete, as would be shown speedily enough were Berlin to be bombarded from the skies.

Even though the dread of open belligerency that prevailed in Germany before the war has by now in great measure been appeased, the widespread discontent of the non-political masses has been greatly enhanced by the direct and indirect consequences of the blockade. Above all, women as thrifty housewives and as anxious mothers have been gravely discomfited by the scarcity of essential articles of diet, of footwear, and of clothing; and the daily expenditure of time and strength requisite for the attempt to satisfy these needs is both exhausting and discouraging. The consolations offered them by the obese Goering sound derisory, while dread of Himmler's

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Gestapo will not prevent women's tongues from wagging while they stand for hours in queues, any more than it will prevent their whispering to one another about secret sources of 'black' supplies.

But what gets to work most powerfully among the Germans who are politically apathetic, what makes them Hitler's most dangerous enemies, is their remembrance of the last war. The increasing privations of 1917 and 1918 are the nightmares of the German women of 1939 and 1940, while the men meditate on the horrors of inflation, which robbed them of wages, savings, and profits, without a chance of defence. Neither proclamations nor bullying nor promises counteract these memories, for there was no lack of them twenty years ago, and little good did they do. Nor are the boastful reports of victories in Poland, of successes in the air, of the sinking of Allied ships by German submarines, any more effective. Every German who is over thirty knows full well that Ludendorff, likewise, conquered the whole of Poland, the whole of Serbia, the whole of Rumania, and that then Bulgaria and Turkey fought on Germany's side; every German over thirty knows how daily, weekly, and monthly the naval chiefs issued bulletins regarding the successes of the German submarines — successes that outdid even the victorious bulletins of Raeder and Goering — and that the end of it all were the Forest of Compiègne and the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Memories of these things (especially when they are vigorously exploited by an active propaganda) gives a political stamp today to the general discontent of the German people even when that discontent is not really the outcome of political causes.

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Goebbels' declaration that 99 % of the German people are backing Hitler cannot be more strikingly disproved than by quoting the fact so incautiously divulged by the same propagandist concerning the famous vote taken among the inmates of Dachau concentration camp. They numbered 1572. Of these 1554 voted for Hitler, 8 against, while 10 abstained. Here you have your 99 % in favour of Hitler, but everyone knows what the 99 % of Dachauers were really thinking and feeling.

To sum up, then, we can be confident that the general atmosphere of dissatisfaction which is the first essential for every revolution undoubtedly exists today in the German people. The necessary stressing of the numerous, and for the most part non-political, causes of this discontent does not weaken its significance, since we are concerned only with a general atmosphere, and not with a lucid manifestation of the popular will.

This underlines the importance of the second of the three questions we set out to investigate in this connexion. Does there exist in Germany today a minority of persons willing and able to take action?

Of course we begin our answer by reminding ourselves of those who were Hitler's political adversaries before he seized power. Independents, majority socialists, democrats, centrists, 'People's Party' men, and German nationalists formed the patchwork front of those who from the end of 1918 to the end of 1932 shared responsibility for Germany's political life, and their representatives who were disqualified by Hitler therefore form the core of the German 'émigrés in the narrower sense of the term' (persons who, though they have not taken refuge

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abroad, may be assumed on principle to be opposed just as if they had fled).

To the left and to the right of those who were disqualified when Hitler seized power there were at that time the opposition groups, consisting of those who fought against Weimar just as they fought against Hitler — the Communists and the Black Front. The former were, or are, supporters of an international-Marxist-revolution; the latter were, or are, supporters of the German Revolution, that is to say of a new order in the sense of national freedom, social justice, and European collaboration.

In addition to these political groups of persons who oppose Hitler at home and abroad, there are the racial and religious groups of Hitler's adversaries: notably the Jews against whom Hitler and Streicher have preached a crusade; and the Catholic and Protestant Churches persecuted by Hitler and Rosenberg — in so far as they have not wholly or partially submitted. Of late, too, there has been what we may call a quasi-economic opposition, witnessed to by the flight of Edmund Stinnes to London, and even of Fritz Thyssen (who was a member of the Hitlerian Reichstag) to Switzerland.

The mere enumeration of these groups indicates how diversified are the trends, how varying the strength and the kind, of this multifarious oppositional movement against the Hitler System. Its extremely mixed composition is enough to show that no unified and vigorously acting community could possibly be formed out of it.

Speaking first of the 'dethroned Weimarians', their pugnacity diminishes as you pass among them from left to right. Even among the majority socialists there were

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men of note, like Noske and Severing, who made peace with the Hitler System, while many other prominent members of this group became 'non-political'. Nevertheless it may be proclaimed that not only the party chiefs Wels and Vogel who became émigrés (taking refuge first in Prague and then in Paris), but also the steadfast old members of the party who stayed in Germany, continued firm opposition to the Hitler System, and that they could still rally many supporters from among the German working class.

The centrist Catholics proved less reliable, and still less reliable the bourgeois democrats. Almost all their leaders made peace with Hitler, and even refugee politicians like Brüning, Wirth, and Koch took up an attitude of reserve which (since they had considerable influence in England and the U.S.) was indirectly favourable to the Hitler System. Not until the anti-Christian policy of the Hitlerians became more marked, was a stronger opposition carried on from the Catholic side, but it never became distinctively political.

The same considerations apply more markedly to the 'People's Party' and German nationalist opposition, which was chiefly represented abroad by Treviranus, an ex-minister of the Reich. (There is a creditable exception, Dr. Rauschning, a German nationalist who was at one time president of the Danzig Senate.)

This brief sketch of the opposition formed by the various parties of the Weimar Republic makes it plain that only the social democrats were capable of producing a minority 'able and willing to take action' against the Hitler System; whereas the opposition formed by the other groups (individual exceptions apart) could do no

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more than intensify the general dissatisfaction; but was, even so, of considerable importance, especially in the religious sphere.

Fundamentally different, that is to say pugnacious, are the two opposition groups that stood on the left and right flanks of the old party opposition to the National Socialists, namely the Communists and the Black Front. In structure they were of a much more revolutionary type than the old legalist or constitutional party apparatus, and furthermore by their struggles in the pre-Hitler period had been better prepared for the new fighting conditions of illegality.

There can be no doubt that down to the outbreak of the war the Communists formed an opposition to the Hitler System, an opposition that was not always very adroit and consistent, but was absolutely uncompromising. If nevertheless they had no striking success, this is partly because since 1920-1921 the German people had inwardly outgrown the Communist peril; partly because the dictatorship of the Browns did not encourage a yearning for the dictatorship of the Reds, but rather favoured a desire for democratic freedom and self-government.

How much justification there was for the ingrained prejudice of the German people against the Communists was shown by the Hitler-Stalin pact, which gave outward expression to the internal kinship between the two systems.

With the formation of the Stalin-Hitler alliance the Communists were done for in Germany, both in their influence upon the German people and in the number of their membership. Inasmuch as every Communist both

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at home and abroad was transformed from an enemy of Hitler into an ally of Hitler, the German people (the industrial workers not excepted) ceased to draw a distinction between Communist and Hitlerian.

Since then, Communism in Germany has no longer been part of the opposition to Hitler, and this, perhaps, is the most satisfactory result of the Hitler-Stalin pact. For just as in foreign policy the clear line of the European struggle and still more of European reconstruction would have been blurred if Bolshevik Russia had continued to play a part in the democratic camp, so in home policy it would have been a misfortune had Communism been able to assert its claims as part of the German opposition to Hitler.

As concerns the Black Front, of which I am the leader, it has not only the tactical advantage of an organization which was from the first designed for secret (= 'black') work, but has also the advantage from the outlook of principle of having never taken part in the failures of the Weimar period. Still more important was the fact that it accurately foresaw and foretold the development of the Hitler System, with the result that its early members were strengthened in their convictions, and new recruits were steadily gained. Sufficient proof of this is given by the first January issue in 1937 of the Black Front organ known as 'Die Deutsche Revolution', of whose contents a full translation will be found in the Appendix to the present work (see below, p. 229). Since then the members of the Black Front in the Reich have been fortified by the evolution that has taken place in the interim. Of course this has not only increased their confidence, but has also promoted their influence on the

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surrounding strata of the population. The last notable point is the unique position of the Black Front in relation to the party and to the army — a matter about which there will be more to say in Part Two.

I cannot conclude this discussion of 'the minority of persons willing to take action' without considering the position of the army, which has a special part to play in the Hitler System. For a long time the hopes of foreign adversaries of Hitler (bourgeois for the most part) were concentrated upon the army, and they based these hopes upon what happened on June 30, 1934.

But they overlooked what I had set forth five years ago in my book *Die deutsche Bartholomäusnacht* [The German Massacre of St. Bartholomew] that on this very day Hitler had decided for what the generals wanted — namely for the war against the revolution. Subsequently the union between Hitler and the generals became closer and closer: Hitler complied with his allies' extravagant demands for armaments, and in the end even agreed to the pact with Russia they had unceasingly clamoured for, asking no more in return than that they should be loyal to his person and his system. When, on February 4, 1938, the remaining members of the general staff who had independent characters (above all, Generals Fritsch and Beck) were dismissed, this loyalty was ensured, and the 'Reichswehr Myth' had achieved its purpose.

It need hardly be said that this does not mean identity of views and aims between Hitler and the general staff. The grave internal and external dissensions between army and party persist, over and above the inevitable rivalry. Anyone acquainted with Prussian generals know that their egoism exceeds their loyalty. They would

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not dream of allowing themselves to be dragged down to destruction with Hitler, and if Hitler's ruin were imminent they would seize any chance of saving themselves by the sacrifice of the Chancellor and his paladins. But this has nothing to do with opposition; it only means that the generals are unprincipled.

Since Hitler's purge of the general staff to rid it of men of character, there is, so far as concerns our search for a minority of persons 'willing and able to take action' in Germany, no dependence to be placed upon the leaders of the armed forces of the Reich. But it is otherwise as regards the commissioned officers of medium grade, especially in the army (for there is less to be said about the airforce and the navy). In these army circles not only does the best tradition of the German officers' corps remain active, but politically as well the ideas of the 'Schleicher School' still prevail — a school in which thousands of captains and majors were trained in youth. Among them there is, on principle, strong opposition to the Hitler System, while they cherish bitter memories of the murder of their leaders Schleicher and Bredow. It would be inexpedient to say much about this just now, but there can be no doubt as to the facts. Whereas the generals of the German army are an unprincipled lot, and the subalterns are ambitious youngsters who are politically apathetic or even devoted to Hitler — the majority of the staff officers are persons of blameless character, and in political matters are convinced as well as actively disposed opponents of the Hitler System.

To summarize the results of our search for 'a minority of persons willing and able to take action' against the Hitler System, we have found that such a minority really

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exists in the German nation, but still lacks unity of organization and purpose. It comprises three groups, the socialist group, the Black Front group, and the army group. In a word, it represents the Leipart-Strasser-Schleicher constellation which once before (in December 1932) was a deadly peril to Hitler. If it should prove practicable to bring these three groups into accord on the lines of the Schleicher-Strasser-Leipart combination, the anti-Hitler revolution would have a good chance of success.

The last stage of our study of the fundamental prerequisites for a successful revolution against the Hitler System brings us to more concrete elements, the active defenders of that system; to the question whether a paralysis of will is likely among them. Who are they, these active defenders? In the narrower sense they are the army, the S.S. (Storm Guards), and the S.A. (Storm Troops), in the wider sense they are the whole National-Socialist Party and its members.

As regards the army, the foregoing disquisition has already solved a considerable part of our problem. Within the army there are strong and influential forces which are not merely untrustworthy from the outlook of upholders of the system, but are convinced opponents, and ready to take action. They will take action as soon as they are convinced that Hitler has become a danger to the national existence of Germany. A glance at the three-year-old Black Front periodical (see Appendix) will disclose the problem that faces every German officer and every German ranker with a sense of national responsibility — the problem of, Hitler or Germany?

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(Appendix, p. 232). There is no decent ranker, there is no decent officer, who would not answer 'Germany' if he could only grasp the national necessity for a decision.

Himmler is well aware of this. The reports of thousands of spies who act as orderlies in the officers' mess-rooms have informed him of the spirit that is afoot — a spirit he fights in all possible ways. Everyone in the German army knows of the 'skirt' method he used so successfully in the cases of Blomberg and Brauchitsch; and also of the homosexual method he tried against Fritsch — but unavailingly, so that later he was compelled to have recourse to the time-honoured plan of assassination.

Exceedingly symptomatic was the speech upon *The Home Front in Germany* which he made to the officers' corps in the summer of 1937, whose wording shows much more plainly than does that of countless newspaper and magazine articles by refugees both Himmler's dread of the armed forces of the Reich and the Hitler System's dread of an internal revolution.

For defence, Himmler relies upon the police, the Gestapo, and especially upon the S.S., the Storm Guards and their 'Death's-Head Battalions'. Let me give a word-for-word extract from the aforesaid speech:

'Should war break out, I shall have the following tasks to perform. In view of what I consider to be the duties of the police, 15,000 men, or not more than 20,000 at the outside, will be withdrawn for service with the colours. The present total force of uniformed police is from 80,000 to 90,000. We have to remember that the great majority of these uniformed police consists of men who are over forty-five, or let us say over forty years of age, and there-

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fore if I allow from 15,000 to 20,000 of the younger men to go to the army, I shall be parting with the steel of my police. In case of need I can replace them by calling back to active police duties men over fifty-five or over sixty.

'This will only be practical if I can make sure of an inner "stiffening" to be used for big and important actions. It will consist of the "Death's-Head Battalions".

'I shall be able to get along with my elderly policemen. The civilians over forty-five years of age who will be called up for auxiliary police service will, as has been arranged, carry out the duties that used to be assigned to the Landsturm. They will be able to do sentry-go at munition factories, railway-bridges, etc. — always providing that I have some younger men as "stiffening". These will be men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five belonging to the "Death's-Head Battalions" not older and not younger. I don't want very young men, or men who are well up in years, for the "sabotage-troops" and the "terror-troops" will consist of lively young fellows with up-to-date weapons — and I shall never be able to fight them with elderly Landsturmers.

'The "Death's-Head Battalions" will be stationed in every governmental district throughout Germany. They will be disposed of as follows:

'1. No Battalion will be stationed in its own native district. For instance, a Pomeranian Battalion will never serve in Pomerania.

'2. Each Battalion will be transferred to a new district every three weeks.

'3. No Battalion will be given street duty with its members isolated. It would never do for a man wearing the death's-head emblem to be stationed alone in the streets.

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'4. This force will act ruthlessly. That is what it will be for.'

There can be no doubt that the Storm Guard Battalions, living in barracks, will fulfil their chief's hopes and will act ruthlessly towards their own nationals. But there is likely to be a hitch here in the case of Storm Guard Battalions not quartered in barracks. (This applies to nearly four-fifths of the total force of 300,000 men, for not more than 80,000 are kept in barracks.) They are simply working men, townsmen, and peasants — part of the people, and subject therefore to the popular mood.

This applies even more to the S.A., the Storm Troops. Numbering millions, they enjoy few of the advantages granted to the S.S., the Storm Guards; they are not to serve on the foreign front, but only on the 'home front'; this suffices to place them among the field-grey masses and estranges them from the Brown Shirts — let alone that it increases the long-standing friction between the S.S. (Storm Guards) and the S.A. (Storm Troops).

Even more decisive is the fact that comparatively few of the Storm Troopers are among the 'profiteers' of the system. On the contrary, they have for years been deceived and betrayed — especially since June 30, 1934. Immediately after the alleged attempt on Hitler's life in 1939, I got hold of a letter penned by one of the chiefs of the Storm Troopers, which contains the following passage (quoted verbatim):

'Various recent happenings have pleased me very much, although they have left a bitter taste in the mouth. All the same, with regard to the candidate for death I

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hold Schiller's view, "The man must be helped". Unfortunately, like the rest of us in Germany, I am badly off for news. My wireless apparatus doesn't work very well, for it needs an overhaul; and as for the newspapers, they lie so glibly that when one reads them one hardly knows whether one is standing on one's head or one's heels. Nothing shows this better than all the hubbub about the unfortunate Elser. What is true that is said about him, and what false? Perhaps you can tell me, for I really don't know. Most of it, I expect, arises out of Goebbels' imagination. I could tell you a lot of fine things, were it not for technical difficulties. But to come to the main point, we shall have to work hard and bring off our coup as soon as possible. We must approach the goal quickly, for there will be little chance of establishing a revolutionary Germany after a long war.'

I am sure that such a mood is the rule rather than the exception among the Storm Troopers, and for years it has seemed to me of the utmost importance to 'poison the minds' of the Storm Troop leaders (here, likewise, the middle grades rather than the men at the very top) with the watchwords of the Black Front. During the years 1933-1938 our *Huttenbriefe* were sent by the million to all sections of the Storm Troops and the National Socialist Party. The specimen reprinted in the Appendix (p. 241) gives an excellent example of our propagandist method.

Especially in the Party (where Gregor Strasser and the protracted work of the Kampf-Verlag (Fighting Publications) have not been forgotten) such activities have been most fruitful, more particularly in the Labour Front and among the Hitler Youth organizations.

What we must do now is make it clear to the abundant

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profit-seekers within the party that Hitler's chances are practically nil, so that they will best promote their own interest if they take time by the forelock and adjust themselves to coming events. This sort of propaganda would induce hundreds of thousands of members, especially among the officialdom, to draw aloof from the regime; and where we are dealing with the more stubborn it will be well to use a stronger tone, and even to employ threats of personal retaliation. With the average members of the National Socialist Party the well-tried lures and deterrents of sweets and floggings will prove even more effective than they do with the generality of mankind.

Having shown that the three essential requisites for an internal revolution do actually exist in Germany, I have therewith reached a point still to be discussed — the tactical necessities for such a revolution.

For simplicity, in expounding the tactical necessities I shall stick to the same classification used in considering the general features of the revolutionary possibility.

As concerns the mood that prevails among the German masses, we must use all possible means for diffusing among them a sound knowledge of the world situation. It is hard for a foreigner to conceive how vast a gulf yawns between the world situation as it actually is, and the world situation as it presents itself to the minds of the German people. After seven years of Hitlerian dictatorship and Goebbelsian propaganda, this impoverished nation, exhausted and isolated both materially and spiritually, has been deprived of the possibility of forming a sound judgment of its own. The antecedents of the outbreak of war, the violation of the Czechs, the atrocities

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in Poland, the betrayal of Finland, the comparative strength of Germany and the western powers — these things are all as unknown to the German people as are the yielding disposition of France during the years 1933-1939 and the peaceful temper of Chamberlain's government. The German people has absolutely no idea of the detestation with which the rest of the world contemplates the Germany of Adolf Hitler, nor yet of the moral, political, and economic isolation of the country, which in 1940 is a hundredfold greater than it was in 1914.

The principal aid to peace will be anything that will acquaint the Germans with these plain facts, with the facts and nothing else. Not until the German people knows the truth will its present dull dissatisfaction be transformed into an active political will.

Here, too, what are spoken of as the 'War Aims' of the western powers play a very important part. One of Hitler's chief endeavours has been and is to inculcate the legend that the western powers desire the 'annihilation of Germany', and that consequently, were it merely for the sake of self-preservation, Germans must rally round their leaders — that is to say round himself. 'We are all in the same boat,' such is the leading theme of Goebbels' propaganda at the present time; and herein he voices nothing but his dread that the Germans may come to realize how the precise opposite is true. Anyone who wants to help himself and Germany must aid in downing Hitler and flinging him overboard.

An intimate knowledge of my fellow-countrymen has taught me that millions of them today are suffering from a conflict between their moral duty and what they still regard as a national duty. Directly the western

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powers avow as their essential war aims the reversal of the violent deeds wrongfully committed by Hitler, but declare that they have no desire to discriminate against or destroy Germany, that very moment there will be an end to the cleavage in the minds of millions upon millions of Germans, and they will tranquilly obey their consciences — against Hitler.

Of course we cannot expect them to undertake an active campaign forthwith. It is idle to ask a fettered prisoner to begin by overpowering his heavily armed warder, and it is unfair to blame him as guilty because he is powerless. What we can demand of the German people, and what we forerunners among the champions of the German Revolution do demand, is passive resistance. But this comprehensive notion must be inculcated in numberless separate preliminary writings, by those able to avail themselves of all possible chances of diffusing information.

We must not say (I am thinking of things that can best be said by Germans) to the German aviator, 'Refuse to obey orders', for in that case as things are at present he will simply be court-martialled and put to death. What we should say is: 'Drop your bomb near what you are aiming at, but don't register a hit. No one can prove that you could have hit. In that way you will help to overthrow Hitler and to save Germany.' We must not say to the German worker, 'Down tools', for he would only be sent to a concentration camp. What we should say is: 'Do your work slowly and badly, misunderstand orders, waste material — but make sure you will never be found out.' To the clerks and officials we must say: 'Make a muddle of what you do; pretend to be stupid or

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overworked; address letters, documents, parcels wrongly; falsify lists and specifications; be tardy and disagreeable in your relations with the public, cautious but stupid in your relations with your superiors — in a word, “throw grit into the bearings whenever you have a chance; and even though each man does only a little, the massed effect will be stupendous.” To business and professional men: ‘Be backward with the authorities, ask the revenue officials question after question, humbug customers while never forgetting to praise the Leader; remind them how Goering said, “Guns are more important than butter”, delay the delivery of stamps on the ground that you are overworked, make complaint after complaint; all this will help to overthrow Hitler and therewith restore peace to Germany and Europe.’

I wrote simply, ‘We must say’. Who are ‘we’, and how can we say it?

‘We’ are Germans who live free and can take up the fight against Hitler. I have enumerated the various groups of such persons. The outstanding personalities among them have a great moral and political responsibility — to their supporters, to the German people, and to the world at large. It speaks ill for them that they have not yet succeeded in forming a representative assembly of the German adversaries of Hitler. An impulse in the direction of establishing in foreign parts such a centralized representative body of Germans would act more quickly and effectively than anything else towards aggregating into united hopes for the future the moods of those malcontents who are scattered throughout the Reich, and towards concentrating the efforts of various

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groups in the minority that would gladly take action against the Hitler System. Nor could anything be more momentous than this in its influence upon the foreign world, whose cooperation will be indispensable to the speedy outbreak of a revolution against Hitler.

Again, ‘how can we say it?’ Uninfluential refugees, grudgingly tolerated as aliens, having no passports, no wireless stations, no funds to spare for direct and indirect propaganda, and persons to be numbered only by tens of thousands — how can we, actively disposed though we are, get in touch with the passive German masses, who are millions upon millions?

Apart from this problem, it is obviously our duty to do our utmost towards ending this war as soon as possible, towards ending it before its full powers of destruction have been wreaked. There can be no doubt that our only way of helping here is to promote the internal revolution against Hitler. The outcome of this preliminary investigation having been that such a revolution is possible, surely it behoves us to use all available means in order to bring it about? Such a question can only be answered in the affirmative. Three years ago Himmler emphasized the importance of *The Home Front in Germany*, and concluded his address to the officers’ corps with the words of warning:

‘An understanding that a completely new type of organization is essential must be universally diffused; so must the idea of the home front in Germany, upon the defence of which the very existence of the German nation will depend if we ever have to bear the burdens of war.’

It is time for the non-German world to understand Himmler’s cry of distress and turn it to account.

CHAPTER ONE

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEACE TREATY

No thoughtful person can fail to be aware that the present war, generated by the very nature and by the will of the Hitler System, will be decisive as to the future political, economic, and cultural order of Europe.

Germany itself, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland give a heartbreaking picture of what this 'order' will be like should Hitler gain the victory.

What will that order be like should the Allies be victorious? We have no picture of it, unless we adopt the fatuous notion that it will be set up in utter forgetfulness of the twenty-five years between 1914 and 1939, that there will be re-established those pre-war conditions whose impracticability could not be better demonstrated than by the events of the two and a half decades that have followed the outbreak of the last great war.

Anyone who is convinced, as I am, that all historical happenings mean something, are the expression of a living development, will regard such reactionary ideas as incredible, and will pay no heed to them when discussing the political future.

If so, however, it becomes still more urgent to enquire what will be the nature of the new order to be established by the peace that will itself be the expression of the coming order.

For here we impinge upon the first question to present

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itself at the close of every war. Shall we really try to make peace, true peace; or shall we be content with an armistice which, while ending the present war, will bear in its womb the embryo of a new one?

It is hard to raise such a question while war is still being waged; for the mere question may readily arouse dissensions within every belligerent power, and thus reduce the energy requisite for carrying the war to a successful conclusion. Since, however, experience teaches that it is even harder, much harder, to settle such a question properly when one side has gained a decisive victory, for in these circumstances the heat of passion so readily obscures the light of reason as well as the sense of justice, it is really incumbent on us, while we go on fighting, to prepare for peace, for the true peace that will make the recurrence of our present woes impossible.

But is a true peace possible? Can there truly be 'peace on earth'? Sceptics will be inclined to answer much as one who plays a leading part in this war answered me when I put the question that forms the title of this chapter: 'Are you fighting for a peace, or only for an armistice?' His reply was: 'What do you suppose? Every peace is nothing more than an armistice. The more difficult the peace, the longer will be the pause before the next war.'

Since I consider that the teachings of history dictate to us the laws of politics, I could not but agree, for the question was too general in its terms.

But if the question be put more concretely, in the form, 'Is durable peace possible in Europe?' I should answer, once more guided by the teachings of history, with an emphatic 'Yes'.

ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PEACE

2. ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PEACE

At bottom what are wars but the struggles of growth among the nations? As soon as the peoples of a particular family of peoples within a particular area have finished growing, there cease between these peoples in this particular area the crises that result from the way in which growth has made them elbow one another, just as the cessation of feuds among the tribes and the clans established peace in the national units we now call Spain, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, etc. The end of the century-old struggle within these nations was a sign of the ripening of the characters or the personalities of these ripened nations, of the end of their 'becoming' stage. This was the necessary antecedent of the settlement that will finish the 'international' quarrels within the family of European nations.

Who can deny that all the nations of Europe, whether large or small, have entered the ripening phase of nationhood? Where can you find the Czech who wants to become a German; the Pole who wants to become a Russian; the Bulgarian who wants to become a Rumanian; or the Croat who wants to become a Serb — to say nothing of the nations that ripened yet earlier? Now the close of this ripening process necessarily involves our putting an end to any sort of intra-European imperialism — thus making both possible and indispensable a collaboration on the basis of the unconditional recognition of the freedom and independence of all the national 'personalities' which today comprise the European family.

Is not the remarkable lack of hatred in this war an indirect proof that the European nations feel themselves

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to belong to one family? Is not the talk about war aims that goes on simultaneously in the countries of all the belligerents a sign that, despite the struggle that continues, they have a yearning for community? Even Hitler and Goebbels feel impelled to declare that their only war aim is 'defence of Germany's right to live'; even they have to hide their imperialist actions behind a cloud of peaceful words, and to deck out the attack upon Europe they are delivering in concert with Stalin as a phase in the birth of Europe.

Have not the governments of the western powers also officially declared their war aim to be 'no territorial conquests, but a guarantee of security'; and is not this declaration a proof that those who take the lead in Britain and France have deduced the consequences of the completion of the ripening process among the nations of Europe and are determined to build thereon the coming peace?

But if this is so, we have no reason to fear that the coming peace will be nothing more than an armistice, and therefore it behoves us Germans to give the material and ideal guarantees of the security to which all the European nations are unconditionally entitled.

The central problem of the coming peace negotiations may therefore be stated thus:

How shall we combine the right to live of the German people who inhabit the centre of Europe, with other Europeans' need for security — and especially the need of the nations that adjoin Germany, the nations whose right to live is independent of what may happen to be their size?

DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?

3. DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?

Our formulation of the central problem will command almost unanimous assent, but there will be differences now that we come to the solution.

It would be foolish to deny that the demand for the disintegration of Germany will automatically tend to be voiced more loudly by the Allies the more the war spreads and the longer it lasts.

Just because this is so obvious, and for those who would be guided only by feelings so justifiable a trend, I will avoid trying to answer it on moral grounds. I shall content myself with a sober political rejoinder, which runs: 'True, the annihilation of an adversary will make it quite certain that he will never want to fight you again, and will therefore ensure a lasting peace'. The best example that can be cited to illustrate this is the example of the destruction of Carthage at the close of the third Punic war. The Romans killed all the men and boys of Carthage, sold the Punic women and girls into slavery, and razed to the ground the buildings of the rival city; and they symbolized the permanency of the destruction by driving a plough over the desert where Carthage had formerly stood. History tells us that there were no more Punic wars.

If an adversary can be definitively destroyed, a victorious power will naturally ask whether this will not be the best way of guaranteeing the security of its own people. Certainly I can find no moral arguments against such a course, though I am strongly convinced that under the sign of the cross such arguments would carry far more weight than they did in the days of pagan Rome. From

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the practical point of view, it was quite possible to kill half of the remaining 100,000 to 120,000 inhabitants of unhappy Carthage, and to sell the remaining half into slavery. But how could that be done with 70,000,000 Germans? Physical extirpation is simply out of the question, even if it were to be considered the best way of establishing peace in Europe.

I need not trouble to prove that no man living has so crazy an idea as this when he contends that the disintegration of Germany might be the best possible way of guaranteeing the peace he hopes to see established. He does not dream of the bodily extermination of the Germans, but of the destruction, or at any rate the weakening of the political organization of the country — of the disintegration of the German State.

The disintegration (or partition) of Germany means here that the left bank of the Rhine shall be annexed by France, or shall become a puppet State under French control; that East Prussia, with Danzig, the Corridor, and parts of Silesia, shall become Polish; that Sudetenland shall go back to a restored Czechoslovakia; that Austria shall be assigned to the Habsburgs (preferably to be combined with Czechoslovakia and Hungary into a 'Danubian Federation'); and that the remnants of Germany shall become 'protectorates', if possible under the tutelage of the recalled princely houses: the aim of all this being the permanent political impotence of the German people, whose activities are to be restricted to intellectual culture, industry, and agrarian production.

I shall not attempt to deny that this scheme may appear most desirable to the French, who less than seventy years ago suffered from the savage onslaught of

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the Germans; or to assert that it would seem too cruel in the eyes of the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, who have been afflicted even more cruelly by the terrorist methods of Hitler.

On the contrary, for years I myself and many other German patriots have dreaded that this grotesque scheme may some day be realized, and it is as German nationalists inspired by such a dread that we have, in great measure, been prompted to carry on our campaign against the Hitler System. Let me again refer the reader to the illicit Black Front periodical which was circulated by millions in the Reich at the beginning of 1937, and is reproduced verbatim in the present work (See Appendix, p. 229).

Once more I will answer with practical rather than with moral arguments, by asking whether such a disintegration of Germany would create and stabilize peace.

I frankly recognize the possibility of such a disintegration of Germany, and I know that with a conquered nation the victors can do what they please — for a time. But how long will it last?

A peace settlement which is not felt and thought to be just by the conquered, will endure only so long as the conquerors have, and use, force to sustain it.

First, then, would the German people feel and think such a disintegration of Germany to be 'just'? I do not believe that any man or any woman can honestly say 'Yes'. If there are persons who can believe that economic security and possibilities for cultural development could reconcile the Germans to political castration, then I am convinced that such persons are labouring under a profound delusion. Just because they have, as I say,

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'ripened', all the nations in Europe — the German nation not excepted — lay the utmost stress upon political freedom, which includes the possibility of independently developing whatever form of national existence they may prefer.

Perhaps after a crushing defeat, and after seven years' hunger and bodily chastisement, the German people might accept such peace terms without demur, but as soon as their palsy was over, as soon as the will-to-live became active once more, the will-to-freedom, the will-to-independence, and the will-to-equal-rights would also return, and every German, young or old, would regard a fight for German liberty and German unity as his supreme aim.

Would this be wrong-headed? Is there a Frenchman, an Englishman, a Pole, or a Czech who would act differently in a similar situation?

Never will the Germans accommodate themselves to the disintegration of Germany, to the tearing of their country to tatters. If such peace terms are enforced, those who enforce them will have to reckon upon the permanent hostility of the Germans.

What this means is that the victors will have to remain perpetually under arms to hold the Germans down — nay more, that they will have to pile up their own armaments proportionally with the recovery of the German people from the consequences of defeat.

It means, last not least, that the victors will have to reckon with the fact that a nation of 70,000,000 living in Central Europe will be ready, at any moment when there is an uneasy international situation (a war in the Far East, troubles in the Pacific, threats from Russia, or what

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not), to join forces with the disturbers of the peace, hoping under the shadow of this new menace to carry on their own struggle for freedom.

These are not moral arguments, neither menaces nor hopes — they are facts, hard facts, reinforced by the lessons of history and by the study of national psychology. Some may try to dismiss them as trifling, but none can deny their existence.

What could the disintegration of Germany signify, really; but that such a 'liquidation' of the war would eternalize the heavily armed and tense condition of Europe? It would signify that the Germans would concentrate their energies on unsettling the settlement, and that the other nations would have to concentrate theirs on trying to maintain it.

Peace? That would not be peace, but an armistice filled with hatred, an armistice whose duration would be limited by the strain put upon the victors to keep adequately armed — a strain that would grow worse the longer the armistice lasted.

CHAPTER TWO

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

I. PARTITION OF PRUSSIA

At this stage it becomes necessary to insist that with the rejection of the plan to disintegrate Germany there must be associated practical proposals and guarantees from Germany for the security of her neighbours. The other nations of Europe, having been alarmed by Germany's foreign policy of late, will make it their first and most urgent demand that their governments shall fulfil what has been their principal war aim — and it is essential that the German people should give the requisite pledges and guarantees, having recognized that its own future in Europe is dependent thereon.

Nor must any German statesman fail to understand that German utterances and promises, even when signed, sealed, and delivered, are now practically valueless on the international exchange. Too often have German governments, made up of no matter what persons, failed to keep their pledges, broken their oaths, and treated documents duly signed by them as no more than 'scraps of paper'. No clear-sighted German publicist will take it amiss if non-Germans now demand from Germans, not words, but deeds.

The most decisive of such deeds will be the partition of Prussia.

In view of the profuse outpouring of historical literature during the last great war, there is no need to adduce

PARTITION OF PRUSSIA

detailed justification of this demand. Suffice it to say that as long ago as 1931 the Black Front endorsed the idea in its first public statement of aims, entitled *Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus* [Structure of German Socialism], penned by myself (see below, pp. 117 and foll.); and that on September 20 of the same year, in No. 34 of its central organ 'Die Schwarze Front' (of which I was editor), it gave an exact description — with a map — of the proposed partition of Prussia, and of what was to be the territorial distribution of the New Germany.

Consequently the German demand for the partition of Prussia originated, not under the stresses of war, not because of fear of military defeat, not as the outcome of foreign or refugee influence — but owing to the overwhelming logic of a study of the political and religious structure of Germany, its history, and its motive forces, when contemplated by a European consciousness. I regard it as of the utmost importance to insist on this today.

No one well acquainted with the spirit of Germany can overlook the fact that for centuries within the German people there has been a mental and political struggle between what I have called the Frederician (the Prussian) and what I have called the Theresian (the Austrian) sections. This may be compared with the struggle that goes on in a child's mind between the paternal and the maternal elements — a struggle which, as character develops — ultimately leads to the formation of a (new) unity. The concept 'German' contains, and transcends, both the Frederician (Protestant) and the Theresian (Catholic) elements, wherein is mirrored all the multiplicity of the tribal souls that have respectively contri-

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buted to the over-riding concept 'German', without having, so far, completely merged their identity in it.

Considered from an evolutionary standpoint, 'Prussian' signifies the fateful domination of a partial element over the whole, and is analogous to what is seen in pathology when a cancer results from an excessive and boundless proliferation of certain local cells, that master (and destroy) the organism to which they belonged.

Politically, therefore, the development of Little Brandenburg into Great Prussia represents the growth of a cancer threatening the life of the German body as a whole, and it is a development which must be checked at all costs if Germany, and Europe, are to be saved. For it lies in the very nature of the doctrine 'might is right', a doctrine which forms the heart of the Prussian mystery, that it should know no limits. That was why Brandenburg grew into Prussia; Prussia into Great Prussia, which struts as Germany — in the belief that Great Prussia will grow into the Continental Empire that would like to strut as Europe.

We Germans must ourselves overcome Prussia. We must overcome it territorially, economically, and spiritually; for only when we have done so will New Germany, will New Europe, become possible.

2. FEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES

The fundamental principle of German organization is the federative principle, based upon the German tribes which have for ages been rooted in their respective territories, refusing to merge and willing only to federate.

The political structure of the millenary German Reich

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has been based upon this federative segmentation, upon the voluntary collaboration of all the tribes, upon the organic union of its territories.

This teaching of a great past was rendered inaudible by the clamour of Prussian propaganda. Force replaced voluntary collaboration. The various territories, instead of being given a chance to develop as they respectively wished, were compelled to 'toe the Prussian line'.

The territorial subdivision of Prussia must precede the federalization of Germany, whose territories (like the Swiss cantons) are tribal settlements, historical and economic units, which form voluntary collaborators in the German Reich.

Put more concretely, this signifies the re-establishment of the 'Landschaften' or provinces of Rhineland, Hesse, Hanover, Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg, etc., in place of what now constitutes Prussia; the re-establishment of the provinces of Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria, etc., in place of what now constitute Wurtemberg, Baden, Hohenzollern, Bavaria — in a word, the territorial subdivision of Germany into about fifteen provinces representing political, cultural, tribal, and economic units.

These provinces, having on the average not more than about five million inhabitants each, would enjoy rights of local self-government rather more extensive than those of the Swiss cantons. As do the cantons, each province would control its own government and its own popular assembly; and (this is most important) all its functionaries, from president to postman, would be natives of that particular territory. The aim should even be to make sure that the federal officials assigned to any province should as far as possible be natives of that province.

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The territorial disintegration of Prussia would thus be supplemented by the destruction of the extant centralized administrative apparatus which is one of the most powerful weapons of Prussian power politics. This would be replaced by the federal administrative apparatus of the respective provinces, which in its turn would be localized, with the greatest possible amount of self-government and democratic State-control.

The 'German Reich' would thus veritably become a league of substantially independent cantons, whose joint instruments, the federal government and the popular assembly, would be reinforced and controlled by the body of provincial presidents. It may be taken as a matter of course that Berlin would cease to be the capital of the Reich. I myself think there is a good deal to be said in favour of Ratisbon.

The details of the political structure of New Germany will be considered in Part Three of this book.

Suffice it for the moment to insist that the destruction of Prussia, the reconstitution of the provinces which during the last century and a half have, one after another, been 'gobbled up' by Prussia, the subdivision of Germany into a league of federative provinces, are to be regarded as indispensable preliminaries to the upbuilding of New Germany.

It is heart-rending today to read an account of the disputes between the Allied statesmen and those of Germany that followed the surrender of November 1918. An utter lack of psychological and historical knowledge on the part of the former was supplemented by the stupidity and weakness of the latter, with the result that behind the mask of the Weimar Republic to begin

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with, and behind the mask of Hindenburg and Hitler subsequently, the power of Prussia became firmly re-established, to resume the lost game after the lapse of twenty-one years.

If those who will be responsible for the peace that will some day follow this war want to put an end to the game for ever, they must remember that there is only one way of doing so:

Not by the disintegration of Germany, but by the partition of Prussia.

3. SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

The demand for the 'partition of Prussia' would be not more than half complied with if the term were to mean only a territorial subdivision and the destruction of the centralized administrative apparatus.

The roots of Prussian power are quite as much social, economic, and psychological; and without the destruction of these roots it will avail little to divide the stalks and pluck the leaves, or even to pick the fruit.

The social power of Prussia is based upon the squirearchy, the power of the junkers. These, numbering 18,688, own 16.7 % of the land used in Prussia for agriculture and stock-raising. This is more than one-quarter of the land so farmed, the rest being farmed by the smallholders, the peasants who comprise 4,500,000. The feudalistic caste of the Prussian junkers, the big landowners, form the pillars of the Prussian State, Prussian militarism, and Prussian power politics.

Without the social and economic overthrow of the junker caste, without depriving the Prussian junkers of

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their power, there can be no lasting partition of Prussia, and therefore no New Germany.

Far be it from me (a conservative as well as a revolutionist) to deny the strength, the value, and the significance of this sustaining stratum for the origin and existence of Prussia, and — during a certain phase — of Germany no less. Every people needs a sustaining stratum, and no one but an intellectual out of touch with the actualities of life can fail to see the notable part that has been played by the aristocracy as the sustaining stratum of the nation.

But every sustaining stratum, every aristocracy, must comply with the demands of the time. The French noblesse was slower to recognize this than the English gentry had been, and that was why the French noblesse fell before Danton's revolution, whereas the English gentry survived Cromwell's revolution. The Prussian junker caste does not understand the situation in the least. Neither in 1918 nor in 1933 did it hear the call of the time, but hid as pusillanimously behind the mask of Hitler as it had hidden behind the mask of Ebert, caring only to keep its social and economic power and seizing any chance for carrying on its reactionary policy.

If, therefore, we wish to make an end of Prussianism, we must deal radically with these representatives of political reaction.

This means that the great estates will have to be divided up, and that monopolist industries must be nationalized.

For side by side with the Old Prussian estate of junkers or great landowners, there came into existence after the foundation of the Bismarckian Reich (which,

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under the device of the Weimar Republic, transformed itself more and more into Great Prussia), the New Prussian estate of heavy industrials, represented towards the last by Krupp and Thyssen, much as the junkers were represented by Wangenheim and Oldenburg-Januschau.

It is possible, nay probable, that influential circles in England and France, having sympathy with the Prusso-German social strata that will be hit hard by such measures, will regard the plan as unduly revolutionary, not to say 'bolshevik'. The main argument here must be a political one. The sympathizers must be shown that unless we strike at the roots of the great landowners' and heavy industrialists' power, it will be impossible to make an end of Prussia and Prusso-German imperialism.

It will be necessary, however, to show that this expropriation is not to be effected without compensation, nor yet in favour of the State or of any kind of State socialism, but only in favour of self-governing economic corporations in the industrial domain. (This matter, likewise, will be more fully discussed in Part Three.)

My rejection on principle of any kind of bolshevism (and of the Marxism on which it is based), together with my insistence on the maintenance of individual rights, creative initiative, and the pursuit of economic gain, must protect me against an erroneous interpretation of my demand for the subdivision of great landed estates and the nationalization of monopolist industry.

Whoever recognizes the truth of the saying 'Property makes free', whoever affirms the necessity for a sustaining stratum in any satisfactory social order — must look forward to the new order which will aim at the

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deproletarianization of the people, and at our liberation from the social and economic monopolies under whose harrow no sort of freedom is possible.

4. DEMOCRACY OF THE VOCATIONAL ESTATES

The picture of the far-reaching structural transformation requisite to establish the New Germany (a transformation which would have taken place even without this war because it would have come as the completion of the revolutionary changes that have been going on since 1918) would be unfinished did it not disclose the fundamental democratization that is essential to intra-European collaboration.

For Wilson in 1918, and Chamberlain and Daladier in 1939, rightly insisted that the new condition of Europe, which must be and would be the outcome of the war, could only be lasting if it were based upon democratic freedom and self-government.

But when we say this, we must not forget Germany's experiences from 1918-1933 in the matter of what was called formal democracy; nor the way in which the western powers, under the pressure of the necessities of war, have been compelled to make many changes in the machinery of democratic government.

It must be added that in Germany since Hitler seized power it has become impossible to grant equal rights in any sense to the totalitarian parties of the Nazis or the Bolsheviks; and, on the other hand, that under the hitherto prevailing form of party democracy it would be impossible to refuse them these equal rights; and,

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finally, that the social and economic dethronement of what have heretofore been the leading strata must somehow be ensured under the future form of democracy (read 'popular government').

All these considerations join forces for the rejection of party democracy in the New Germany, and for the acceptance of the democracy of the vocational estates.

Those acquainted with the internal development of Germany may be glad to discern here the old ideas of the councils' system which in 1918-1919 the masses of the people vainly urged the petty-bourgeois social democratic leaders to work for. (From the first at that time the traditional forces of Prussian-Germany were powerfully operative among the petty-bourgeois social democratic leaders.)

Today, when the party of Hitlerism and Bolshevism numbers many millions, every keen observer of German conditions will agree that nothing but the elimination of all parties and the inauguration of a democracy of the councils and the estates can create the new form of democracy that is essential both for home and foreign affairs.

Once more I am only dealing here in outline with a matter that will be more fully discussed in Part Three of my book; and the fact that the program was drafted in the years 1930 and 1931 should convince my readers that the proposals were based upon the then situation of Germany, and have not arisen out of the actual position of the belligerents.

The basic maxim of this new form of democracy runs: self-government by the estates, and their direct control of the political administration.

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There are two routes along which this goal will be reached: first by the construction of a comprehensive organization of persons engaged in all vocations, in five councils of manual workers, peasants, employees and officials, manufacturers and traders, and members of the liberal professions.

Secondly the people at large will secure its share of power through joint chambers of estates which will be set up in every district, every province, and last of all in the Reich, to become a determinative factor in administration and legislation.

This system of popular representation based upon direct and indirect elections, representing in the councils the economic interests and in the vocational estates the political popular interests, seems to be the only way of avoiding in Germany, not only any return of the reaction, but also any revival of the Nazi and Bolshevik party movements.

5. THE NEW SPIRIT

No political, social, and economic methods of organization would be of permanent value, unless this work were crowned by the deliberate inauguration and cultivation of a new spirit.

This spirit of the New Germany must and will be a repudiation of the belief that might and force should regulate the social life of mankind. There must and will be a recognition, both in substance and in form, that voluntary collaboration is to be the basis of human society.

Force or voluntary collaboration? — that is one of the

THE NEW SPIRIT

fundamental matters about which this war is being fought. The answer can only be collaboration, both national and international.

In Germany this new Spirit (which was as clearly foreshadowed by Herder, as the spirit of William II and Hitler was foreshadowed by Hegel) is most clearly manifested by the passionate repudiation of the idols of the totalitarian State, and by the whole-hearted acceptance of Christianity with its doctrines of the freedom and dignity of the human soul.

In defiance of the Old Prussian prophets of State-hegemony and the modern German advocates of race-hegemony, the spirit of the West proclaims the fathership of God and the sonship of man — of all men — and insists upon the dependence of all human institutions (the State not excepted) upon the Law of God.

We fully recognize that the polarity Emperor-Pope, State-Church, represents the very essence of Europe, which cannot be removed, cannot be dispensed with, without destroying the spirit and the soul of Europe.

Freedom of the spirit, of belief, of conscience, are the foundations of Europe, and New Germany would cut itself away from Europe should it fail to proclaim them and to respect them.

No less important as fundamentals of this European spirit of the New Germany, are the independence of the press, of science, and of art, which must be free from any sort of State interference or social monopolization.

Education and the school should have no other aims than to promote the development of free personalities, to foster the growth of frank and great souls. They will best do this by ensuring the unrestricted development of

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the divine soul, thanks to which each of us, after his kind and according to his powers, can fulfil himself, and thus sing the praises of the Creator who fashioned his soul as it is and no otherwise.

The diversity of human beings, the differences among them in quality and value, their varying powers and their varying tones, are intrinsic. All that education can achieve is to foster the beauty of the tones given out by each soul, so that when sounding together they can produce the harmony that will guarantee inward and outward peace.

6. RENUNCIATION OF MILITARISM

Such an avowal of a new spirit would be an idle declamation unless it had prompt political consequences.

For the New Germany, one of these decisive results would be the renunciation of Prussian militarism both on principle and as a form of organization.

Unquestionably in foreign parts the idea of Prussia was embodied, not so much in the knowledge of any philosophy she might proclaim, as in an experience of what use she made of her highly developed militarism. Her practice counted for more than her precept, were it only because of the sinister consequences of her practice.

In this connexion we must on no account forget to allow for two decisive facts: first of all that, as a famous historian has said, the nineteenth century was pre-eminently the age of imperialism, and therefore manifested a distinctive political structure that was by no means confined to Prussianized Germany; secondly that militarism had become a strange epidemic phenome-

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non, an epidemic malady of the now unbelieving souls of European human beings.

No less notable a man than Masaryk, a great statesman and philosopher (whose pupil I may take this opportunity of again declaring myself to be) recognized this phenomenon, and described it as follows:

'Modern militarism, especially Prussian militarism, is, considered scientifically and philosophically, a system of objectification — a panic flight on the part of morbid subjectivity and suicidal mania . . . When Sombart, in the Hegelian manner, extolled German militarism, and bragged about fighting in the trenches beside Faust and Zarathustra, he did not realize how he was condemning German and European civilization as drenched with blood. What else is the war-making of modern civilized human beings than a panic flight from the anxieties that arise in the 'ego' of the superman. That is why, as regards bellicosity, the intellectuals are as bad as, or worse than, the agriculturists and the urban workers. . . . Modern man suffers from a morbid suicidal impulse, from the fatigue and the anxiety that result from his spiritual and moral isolation. Militarism represents the superman's attempt to escape from this malady, which it really aggravates. In the nation of thinkers and philosophers there is the largest percentage of suicides; that nation has the most highly developed militarism, and it was mainly responsible for the world war.'

Masaryk had good reasons for emphasizing this characteristic feature of contemporary Europe; and he pointed out as the crowning 'sin' of Prussia that there the spiritual malady of modern Europeans had been promoted into an ideal and a system.

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The German people, more subject than any other to this spiritual malady and suffering from it in its worst form, taking to heart Clemenceau's profound remark that the Germans' chief danger is their being in love with death, must do their utmost to seek a cure.

A radical and lasting cure can only come from a religious revival, can only come from their giving a new significance to life by internal freedom and devotion to Christianity.

Prussian militarism must be overcome; in the spiritual field by a new ideal of life, and in the practical field by a new military organization.

In the last section I mentioned the philosophical aims of education and the school. To these must be added the practical aim of drafting and exercising a new ideal of life. The hysterical heroism which has been adopted as the ideal of life in Hitlerian Germany, must be shown to be what it is, must be condemned and rejected as deceptive, as a swindle, as a denial of the truth of life.

The joy of life, the Song of Songs whose strophes must be unfailingly sung to an impoverished, proletarianized, mechanized, and nihilistic mankind, will be the best prophylactic of the epidemic disease of suicidal impulse and militarism. When people have grasped the fact that schools of cookery are much more important than schools of politics, and that the amount of laughter which can be heard is the best indication of the quality of their political and economic institutions, the spirit of militarism will have been definitively overcome.

But in practice it will most promptly be overcome by a change in the prevailing military system.

A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

In accordance with my conviction of the diversity of human beings and of their right to self-determination, I hereby declare myself absolutely opposed to universal military service.

In the first program of the Black Front we demanded that army duty in Germany should be a voluntary affair; and this, not least, because thereby would be facilitated the new joint military system of a general European army such as a European Federation will need.

But if (and this will be one of the main topics of discussion at the coming Peace Conference) such a joint military system cannot yet be established by the United States of Europe, there will remain for our model the Swiss militia system, which maintains universal service, but wherein the origin of any form of militarism is rendered impracticable by the most carefully devised democratic safeguards.

Between the two possibilities, between a small professional army under European control and a militia army after the Swiss model, the New Germany will have to choose as the basis of its future military organization — of course in cooperation with the Peace Conference. Neither scheme would leave any scope for Prussian militarism.

7. A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

Theoretical and practical considerations make it expedient to add a few words about the problem which, since the rise of the Hitler System, has become a worldwide problem, and one whose settlement will be an

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urgent topic at the Peace Conference. I refer to the Jewish problem.

In various parts of my *Deutsche Revolution* and in numerous articles in the international press I have expressed the utmost disapproval of the shameless and inhuman anti-Jewish campaign that has characterized the Hitler System; and I may also mention that as early as 1928, in a party periodical, I protested editorially against antisemitism of the Streicher brand, voicing the war-cry, 'Antisemitism is dead. Long live the idea of the People!'

This advocacy of the idea of the People logically implied the disavowal of any valuation of peoples or nations as good or bad, as better or worse, since they all have equal rights, equal needs, and equal duties, in accordance with the will of the Creator, who gave each of them its own kind, its own nature, and its own tasks. This profound respect for organic life, and the fact that it is necessary for us and incumbent on us to recognize and maintain human dignity, imply that it will be an unconditional part of the social and political organization of New Germany to maintain the equal rights of all human beings.

Yet this fundamental principle of equality must not be considered to invalidate the organic law that the peoples and nations are fundamentally different, with the result that they urgently need differences in their social and political institutions — a fact which every government is bound to take into account.

In practical politics, therefore, there arises the problem of national minorities, whose relations to the national majorities in any area may present difficulties not local

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merely (as in Germany, for instance), but pertaining to Europe as a whole. Speaking generally it may be said that a comprehensive and just solution will only be possible within the framework of the European Federation, where the simultaneous interests of almost all the European peoples, whether as States or as national minorities, will ensure that whatever legal arrangements are made will be universally regarded as just, and will therefore be faithfully adhered to.

But since this desirable joint solution will need time to achieve, New Germany will have meanwhile to set to work by herself to solve the problem of national minorities (and therewith the Jewish problem) in that modern spirit which will pay due regard both to the organic laws of ethnical differences and to the moral laws according to which all human beings have equal rights. Politically considered there are three alternative solutions:

- (1) Persons of different racial origin from the majority may be described as foreigners.
- (2) Groups of persons of various racial stamps may be deemed to constitute national minorities.
- (3) Persons belonging to different stocks may be incorporated into the main body of the nation by assimilation.

All three methods are equally possible and equally honourable, with the urgent proviso that every adult person of another stock than that of the majority must himself or herself have full right to decide which method to adopt.

As a matter of principle, there is no difference between the general treatment of the problem of national

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minorities and the treatment of the Jewish problem. If the latter is separately considered here, this is because the peculiar way in which the question has presented itself makes separate consideration expedient.

I recommend the above tripartite approach to the matter as regards the Jews, because the formulation is not the outcome of any fine-spun theory, but is grounded upon the actual circumstances which must form the basis of any new settlement of the Jewish problem.

(1) The category of foreigners emerges from the fact that of late years there has been a widespread development of the movement known as Zionism, which should be supported by all 'nation-conscious' persons and peoples as a genuine endeavour for the renovation of Judaism.

(2) The category of national minorities corresponds to the political fact that European Jewry has been domiciled in Europe for many centuries, and in each country rightly regards itself as belonging to that country, though it does not wish to forsake its own national religion and its own national peculiarities.

(3) The category of assimilation is nevertheless (despite Hitler and his materialistic racial theory) a datum of the position of the Jews in Germany and the rest of Europe, in conformity with the accepted humanist doctrine that every human being is entitled to liberty and self-determination — a doctrine which New Germany will unhesitatingly accept. Although we do not deny our biological subordination to blood, race, and nationality, we must emphatically proclaim that the human spirit is privileged and competent to overcome this subordination, and, as knowledge and choice

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may decide, to adopt the present and future views upon these matters.

It is likely enough that the preponderant majority of German Jews will prefer to belong to the Jewish commonwealth. Among these there will doubtless be many who in former days were antagonistic to Zionism, and perhaps even now are by no means wholly reconciled to it, but will lose their scruples when they become aware that as Jews, as members of the Jewish commonwealth, they can still remain united to Germany while preserving a Jewish stamp — inasmuch as the Jewish national group will be incorporated into New Germany. This very fact, their permanent incorporation into Germany, will distinguish them from the Jews, say, of Palestine or Poland — not in substance, but in many of the forms of life.

Of course this incorporation into Germany is fundamentally diverse from the complete assimilation that will occur in the case of those belonging to the third category. These latter will have to abandon Judaism as a national religion, and will have to give this and other guarantees of their determination to become Germans in every respect. (Consider here the demands which every modern State tends more and more to make of alien elements that are to be incorporated and fully assimilated.)

Of decisive importance as regards this question of the political treatment of minorities (including the Jews) is it that there should be established a State Department of National Minorities whose head must be a member of the government, and would automatically become the representative of the national minorities of his country

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in the League of Nations (and in due course in the European Federation). Inasmuch as he would naturally be chosen from the largest national minority, this minister of State would in Germany obviously be of Jewish blood — a fact which would indicate the soundness of the proposed solution, and would have an excellent effect both at home and abroad.

CHAPTER THREE

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

I. PRELIMINARIES TO PEACE

THE previous sections have been concerned with questions that will become urgent when the war is over, and the way in which these questions are answered will be decisive as to the kind and the duration of the peace that will ensue. They are questions that will primarily have to be solved by the Germans themselves. Their connexion with the present war lies mainly in this, that the war was in great measure launched by Hitler and his henchmen in order to frustrate the solution of these intra-German and economic problems.

But the world-public at large will not be so much exercised about intra-German problems as about problems that have to do with the relations between Germany and her neighbours. These latter are problems that have been raised by the war, and their discussion, before all, will be the topic of the peace negotiations.

Immediately, therefore, we reach the crux of the matter. Will the blunders of Versailles be avoided, or will they not?

The brilliant French historian, Jacques Bainville, whose work on the Treaty of Versailles [*Les conséquences politiques de la paix*, Paris, 1920] is today valued as a

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prophecy that has been fulfilled, joins the German critics of the peace conditions of 1919 — though for other reasons than the Germans. Whereas the Germans consider Versailles to have been unduly harsh, Bainville deems it too lenient — and both parties seem to have been justified by the results.

The fact was that the most urgent problems were then very little understood, so that those who had to solve them were not ready for their task. Old and new outlooks, superficial and profound discussions, sound and unsound methods, were grotesquely intermingled, with the unfortunate consequence that, far from reinforcing one another, they cancelled one another out.

The Peace of Versailles, like those dictated at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, was a nineteenth-century and not a twentieth-century peace. But the peace that follows the present war must give a new visage to twentieth-century Europe.

Without for a moment ignoring the material demands for general security which Germany will have to satisfy in order to atone for her complicity in Hitler's outburst of violence (an atonement whose effects will be more lasting, the more thorough and the more enduring the German repudiation of the Hitler System), the coming peace must be designed with an eye to the future of Europe, to averting the evils that stand in the way of the true pacification and the trusty collaboration of the peoples of our continent.

This peace must embody:

(1) The principle of liberty, of independence, of self-determination for all nations, large or small.

(2) The principle that right, not might, shall prevail

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in all nations, both in their domestic and in their foreign affairs.

(3) The principle of joint security, joint wellbeing, and joint culture.

These same principles must likewise secure expression in the preliminaries to the peace, and in the methods by which it is approached.

On the German side an essential will be that the Germans must repudiate on principle Hitler's unwarrantable use of force, and the conditions that have resulted therefrom. Without such repudiation there can be neither armistice nor peace.

The repudiation of Hitler's unwarrantable use of force will imply the immediate evacuation by German troops of all the non-German areas they may have occupied, and a pledge to pay compensation for any damage they may have done.

This re-establishment of right as against might will not be a part of the peace, but a preliminary to peace, and a main constituent of the agreement for an armistice.

The peace itself, if it is to deserve that name, must not be the upshot of a dictatorship, but of comprehensive negotiations, not only between Germany and her adversaries, for the neutrals great and small must participate in them, probably choosing the United States and Italy as their representatives. A sort of Vienna Congress will have to debate and adjust the interests and wishes of the peoples of Europe, and elaborate a harmony, bearing ever in mind the great commonwealth of Europe and the salvation of the West.

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2. THE GERMAN PARTNER

It becomes necessary here to consider a question which also involves matters of principle. Who will represent Germany at this Peace Conference?

Those who have read my book thus far will see plainly enough that it cannot be an envoy from a masked or modified Hitlerian government, nor yet from a 'government of generals', but must be someone despatched by the government of the German Revolution.

For a successful revolution against Hitler before the military collapse of Germany will not only be the decisive contribution of the German people to the cause of peace, but also the requisite proof of the genuineness and durability of a change in the political structure of the country.

Upon this will not only depend (for the most part) the readiness of the Allies to make a just peace; for nothing else can guarantee that the world has not to do with an act of despair on the part of the German people, or with an attempt at camouflage on the part of the Prussian militarist stratum, but that Germany is honestly animated by the constructive will to upbuild a New Germany and make a voluntary contribution to a New Europe.

If we do our best to ascertain what are the forces and the personalities that can be expected to make the German Revolution, and afterwards to represent Germany at the Peace Conference, we shall be glad to find that within Germany they are far stronger and more unified than is obvious or than people outside Germany suppose.

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This depends mainly upon the fact that the political medley of those who comprise the mass of German refugees in foreign parts does not constitute a proper reflexion of the internal situation of Germany, or of what is taking place there.

The fact that thousands of human beings have fled from a region devastated by earthquake does not create any sort of spiritual unity among them. That is why to refugees, to those who were constituents of a political order that has been overthrown, there clings an odour of Coblenz [a rendezvous of émigrés during the French Revolution a century and a half ago]; why they always seem to be persons 'who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing'.

A few only of the German émigrés, who in mind at least have remained youthful, have had energy for self-knowledge, have been able to go on learning, so that they have been able to place themselves at the front of the coming German Revolution. Not all of them are working outside the frontiers of the Reich. Nor are they merely to be regarded as the vanquished of yesterday. They are the revolutionaries of tomorrow. They have fought, and continue fighting, not only against yesterday (the Weimar Republic), but against today (the Hitler System).

If, bearing these facts in mind, we study the forces of the German Revolution, we encounter a front which manifested itself several years ago in Germany, being then named after its most noted leaders the Schleicher-Strasser-Leipart Front.

Some of the high officers of the armed forces, consisting of Schleicher (the 'socialist general') and his intimates,

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had, animated by a close acquaintance with the dangers of the situation, broken with the junkers (when the Eastern Aid scandal became notorious) and with the great capitalists (Hugenberg and Thyssen), and made successful advances to the revolutionary socialist youth, whose spiritual leader was Möller van den Bruck and whose chief organizer was Gregor Strasser. Together they sought and found a way to the anti-bolshevik but socialist workers who, led by Leipart, had ready in the trade unions the foundation stones for a new future.

To the old powers of Prussianized Germany this alliance of modern officers with the revolutionary youth and the solid elements of the working-class seemed so desperately dangerous that they were resolved at all hazards to smash it; and Hindenburg, the Prussian, with his whipper-in Oldenburg-Januschau, the junker, replaced the revolutionary group of Schleicher, Strasser, and Leipart by the reactionary group of Papen, Hitler, and Hugenberg — with the foreseen (and desired) result that instead of an immediate internal revolution there came, in due course, a war across the frontiers.

But the forces of the German Revolution which then, in the end of 1932, could still be strangled (largely because of the irresolution and muddle-headedness of its leaders), have grown stronger, not weaker, during the seven years of Hitler's rule.

I know (from direct acquaintance and active participation) that the Front of these identical forces has ripened and become more lucid, and that out of it will proceed the German revolutionary government that will overthrow Hitler and create the New Germany.

Its task at the Peace Conference will be far from easy,

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and one to which there is a solitary parallel in history — Talleyrand's task at the Congress of Vienna. Talleyrand, having betrayed Napoleon but being a great French patriot, saved his country at Vienna, where they believed him when he assured them that Napoleon was not France nor France Napoleon, though for fourteen years Napoleon had compromised France even as for seven years Hitler has compromised Germany.

New Germany hopes that the 'Geneva Congress of 1941' will have as much insight into the actual state of European affairs as the Vienna Congress had in 1814; but that Geneva will excel Vienna doubly in courage to dig down the problem to its very roots; and in a will directed ahead towards the rebirth and the future of the West.

3. THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION

One of the first and chief matters to be discussed at the Peace Congress will be the Austrian question.

I know well how complicated it is, too thickly set with thorns — with a thousand hopes and fears, wishes and grudges, expressed and unexpressed — for any sort of simple and easily acceptable solution to be possible.

On the other hand, I must have made so abundantly clear my invincible persuasion of the inalienable right of individuals and nations to self-determination, that I am sure no reader will expect me to believe any valid reasons could be adduced against the exercise of that right in this particular case.

New Germany will therefore proclaim the right of the Austrian people to decide its own future by means

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of an absolutely free and uncontrolled popular vote or plebiscite.

As a matter of course this involves the cancellation of the results of Hitler's conquest, i.e. that only men and women who were Austrian citizens before the German invasion will be entitled to vote. In like manner, the popular decision, at a time and in conditions to be prescribed by the Peace Conference, will have to be taken under international supervision and control, and not under the auspices of any government that may be in power there at the time of the plebiscite.

Finally (and this is in my view an essential feature of all such popular decisions) it is better to avoid having a simple alternative, and to have as large as possible a plurality of questions submitted for consideration.

It seems to me that as regards Austria there are three practicable issues:

- (1) Joining the Germanic Federation.
- (2) Independence of the Red-White-and-Red Schuschnigg Austria.
- (3) Re-establishment of the Black-and-Yellow Habsburg-Austria, either as a personal union with Hungary, or as a Danubian Federation consisting of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

I shall venture no prophecy as to what would be the outcome of such a plebiscite, and shall content myself with affirming that in any case New Germany would abide by the plebiscitary decision of its Austrian brethren.

Joining the Germanic Federation must on no account be confounded with the 'Anschluss' to Hitlerian

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Germany, or with the 'Anschluss' to the Weimar Republic of which there was talk at one time. As previously explained, New Germany will be federal in structure throughout, will be a league of autonomous provinces, and from its size and population Austria would have a considerable say in the Federation. I have said that it must be a firmly established principle of the federal constitution that all officials in a province must be natives of that province, so that in Austria only Austrians would rule and function, in Bavaria only Bavarians, in Rhineland only Rhinelanders. Thus a strong safeguard of the federal structure would be the direct interest of the local intelligentsia in their own locality.

A Red-White-and-Red Austria would seem thereby to be outclassed in respect of the chief points in its program. Besides, the experiment of St. Germain has shown very clearly the weaknesses of such a scheme — though we must remember that the problem of a larger economic area could be solved within the framework of the European Federation. A decisive matter here, however, will be the question of the time-lag, for the Austrian problem will demand prompt solution, whereas in the most favourable circumstances there is likely to be considerable delay in getting the European Federation into working order.

The re-establishment of Habsburg Austria, whether in the direct form of an Austria-Hungarian double monarchy or in the indirect form of a Danubian Federation, presents itself almost as a matter of course, and would find many supporters among the western powers.

In conformity with my principle that the Austrians

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(like any other people) should enjoy the right of self-determination and be left to settle their own affairs, I must point out that the re-establishment of the Habsburg realm is primarily a concern of the Austrian, Hungarian, Czech, and Slovak peoples. Secondly, the demands of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy for security would run counter to any such re-establishment, and these countries might be expected in this matter to have a more lasting pull at the Peace Conference than would the Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks in respect of their right to self-determination. Anyone who recalls the terms of the oath which had to be taken by the wearer of the crown of St. Stephen, will feel that there might be some justification for uneasiness on the part of the neighbours of a re-established double monarchy.

In whatever way the Austrian problem might be formulated, and no matter what solution might seem most accordant to the feelings and interests of those concerned, it remains indubitable that the decisive matter must be the right of self-determination of the people of the country, with due regard to its neighbours' sense of the requirements for their safety.

4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SUDETENLAND

This basic principle will guide us, not only as regards the settlement of the Austrian question, but also as regards the no less important problem of Czechoslovakia and Sudetenland.

Early in this chapter, on page 81, I declared that an essential preliminary to peace negotiations must be an

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evacuation by the German troops of all the non-German areas they may have occupied, and a pledge to pay compensation for any damage they may have done. This applies unconditionally to all regions which prior to 1938 formed part of Czechoslovakia.

It would be unwarrantable for New Germany to appeal to the Munich Agreement of September 1938 on the ground that it was 'voluntarily' signed by the Czechoslovak government, for the signature was really extorted by threats and by force, and the agreement brought nearly a million Czechs under foreign (i.e. German) rule.

But no settlement can be sound if it deprives the Sudetenland Germans of their right to self-determination.

Here the application of the principle will need special safeguards if we are to avoid fresh injustices and the risk of further disturbances.

So much intermingled are Germans and Czechs in Sudetenland, that there a vote by districts rather than a general counting of heads will be expedient. Nor must the existence of 'national enclaves' be made a pretext for arbitrary treatment of surrounding majorities of the rival stock. There may have to be local migrations, or some favoured treatment of minorities.—The matter is touched upon in the section on the Jewish problem (p. 73 and foll.).

Since we have expressly recognized, and must unfailingly continue to recognize, that when a people's right to self-determination is being fulfilled, due regard must always be paid to its neighbours' sense of the requirements for their safety, the definitive solution of the

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Sudetenland problem will mainly depend upon how far the Czechoslovaks feel that their security will be guaranteed by New Germany. Upon the extent of this sense of security will depend the importance that the future Czechoslovakia will attach to a strategic frontier on the German side of their country.

This will, in its turn, be largely decided by the general solution of the Czechoslovak problem, by the boundaries of the country and its internal construction. Primarily these are matters for the Czechs and Slovaks themselves; secondly, especially as regards the question of boundaries, they are matters for the Peace Congress. As far as New Germany is concerned, that country will certainly consider a large and healthy Czechoslovakia to be a most important pillar of Central European order, and also as a welcome partner in furthering German economic life and in keeping Germany in friendly touch with the Western Slavs.

The Czechs, thanks to the conspicuously European trend of their minds, the admirably democratic organization of their government, and their highly developed science and economic system, seem the predestined instructors of the Ruthenians and Ukrainians, as is manifest from the great achievements of Czechoslovakia in promoting the civilization and the cultural development of Carpathian Ruthenia.

The payment of reparations by New Germany to Czechoslovakia (and Poland) is a matter of obvious justice; the assessment of their amount will be a matter for enquiry and negotiation.

Inasmuch as Czechoslovakia and Poland will both desire prompt settlement of accounts, whereas Germany

POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

after Hitler is not likely to have much cash or credit available, the only practicable way of raising funds would seem to be by an international loan, the bulk of which would probably be subscribed in the U.S.A. The most likely way of extracting payments from Germany would be for that country to establish a tobacco monopoly whose profits would be ear-marked for the payment of interest on the loan and the instalments of amortization. Direct control of the business side of the monopoly by representatives of the creditors would provide the necessary guarantees — of course with due regard to political and psychological susceptibilities.

5. POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

A bigger affair, and one even more vital to the permanent re-establishment of Europe, will be the management and the solution of the Polish problem. Not only because the present war broke out in relation to Poland, thus showing clearly where 'the shoe pinched', but also because the future peace of Europe turns more upon this matter than upon any other.

Can a mutually satisfactory arrangement be made to reconcile the conflicting interests of the Germans and the Poles? If not, if the 'open sore' between Germanism and Slavism cannot be healed, there can be no lasting peace in Europe. For so long as the sore remained open, how could any Peace Congress make sure that after another twenty-five years the workers and peasants of France, the inhabitants of Canada, South Africa, and Hindostan, might not again take up arms to intervene

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in a war between Germany and Poland or between Russia and Poland?

The looming of such possibilities, regard for the interests of Europe at large, and (even more) consideration for the joint interests of Germany and Poland, make it possible to discover here also a way out of our difficulties that will be compatible with the rights and the wants of both peoples, and with the provision of guarantees for the safety of the (comparatively weak) Poles.

Immediate evacuation of the parts of Poland occupied by German troops, and a recognition that a war indemnity is due to Poland, will be favourable preliminaries to a settlement, and the offer of German help for the liberation of Eastern Poland may facilitate matters.

The Germans must be prepared to expect that at the Peace Conference demands will probably be voiced for the incorporation of Danzig and even East Prussia into the future Poland.

Apart from the consideration that this would be a fundamental violation of peoples' right to self-determination, such an assignment of territory would inevitably tend to perpetuate a hereditary feud between Germany and Poland.

Seeing that the evacuation of nearly four million Germans from East Prussia would involve widespread misery, and that there would be enormous difficulties — organizational and other — in clearing the regions along the Baltic that have been forcibly colonized by Germans, it is most unlikely that any scheme of this quarrelsome character will be adopted by the Peace Congress. Besides, no conceivable German government could be found to accept it.

POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

More difficult is the question of the Corridor. Here two vital interests are in conflict: the German interest in direct contact with an outlying portion of the Reich; and the Polish interest in a route to the sea.

The recognition that both these interests are vital makes a solution all the more urgent, in order to avert causes of unceasing friction. To begin with, the Germans must admit that for them the only vital matter is the part of the Corridor which ensures direct communication between Pomerania and East Prussia.

Although the region in which the two nations have conflicting vital interests is thus relatively small, this does not make the conflict any easier to evade, for the proposal to have 'a corridor through the corridor' is but a verbal artifice which gives no practical satisfaction.

A solution only becomes possible when we include the Baltic States in the domain of the matters at issue between Germany and Poland, and this will have the advantage of also helping us to solve the extremely difficult Vilna problem.

New Germany will recognize, not only Poland's right to exist, but also that Europe needs a great and powerful Poland.

Poland, the eastern guardian of Europe, the 'limes' of Christendom, must enjoy the material strength and position requisite for the performance of these duties. The cooperation of Poland with the minor Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, not only makes it possible for these three European outposts which live under the menace of Russia to be sure of autonomy and of independent development, but also gives Poland her best chance of attaining a broad sea-front on the Baltic.

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The juxtaposition of the three petty States to Russian military and naval positions convinces us that their freedom can only be guaranteed by their having the protection of a 'big brother' like Poland; and we may be sure that the Poland of the future will carefully avoid the chief error of the Poland of the past, and will eagerly adopt the federative idea.

Enough! New Germany will feel impelled, both for moral and material reasons, to undo the partition of Poland of which Hitler has been guilty. New Germany will therefore offer Poland her help in regaining Eastern and Southern Poland. We may be sure that no Polish government will renounce Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Przemysl, and Lemberg; but we must also consider it unlikely that Moscow will have any inclination for the voluntary surrender of its plunder.

In this matter, too, New Germany will be able to offer the most direct and concrete proof of her determination to make good in the field of reparations. The offer of military aid in regaining Eastern and Southern Poland will do more than the payment of indemnities in hard cash to manifest a complete change in the relations between Germany and Poland, and will react upon the negotiations for Danzig and the northern end of the Corridor. True peace can only be established by respect of the vital interests and the sense of honour of individuals and nations.

6. THE BOLSHEVIK PROBLEM

Several times already in this work I have touched on the problem of Russia, which is greatly complicated by the Bolshevik problem.

THE BOLSHEVIK PROBLEM

Happily what the latter signifies has of late been made clear and become generally recognized thanks to the close political, military, and economic ties between Nazism and Bolshevism.

Bolshevism is a deadly peril to Europe — a peril which within Europe must be overcome, and on the eastern edge of Europe must be made to keep its distance.

The intra-European conquest will be substantially achieved by the overthrow of Hitler and the partition of Prussia (which is an appendage to Russia).

Keeping Bolshevism at a distance on the east of Europe will be one of the most vital tasks of the Peace Conference, and will necessitate radical measures for safeguarding European peace.

The most urgent matter here is to keep Bolshevism away from the Carpathians, and this can be only successfully achieved by extirpating Bolshevism from Europe.

The fulfilment of that purpose, however vital it may be to Europe at large, does not and must not infringe the vital interests of the Russian people.

Anyone well acquainted with the history of Moscow and Russia will discover there evidence of a process akin to that which has gone on in the history of Prussia and Germany — a part has by force made itself master of the whole, and even made itself master of extensive foreign regions. No one can deny that White Russia and Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and the lesser peoples of the Caucasus, were only subjugated by Moscow through the use of force, often after decades of struggle, and that they have never abandoned the longing for freedom. Lenin himself was aware of this, and therefore gave these foreign nationalities at least a formal autonomy — which

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his Caesarian successor has steadily reduced. I do not feel competent, nor do I regard it as essential to the matter in hand, to discuss whether and how far these subjugated nationalities still aspire to independence and crave for a reunion with Europe. If they do, I am passionately convinced they have a right to be freed, and I should deem it one of the basic duties of a genuinely European Peace Conference to bring to these remote brethren the light of freedom and independence.

Especially as regards White Russia and Ukraine, it would seem that upon the comparatively advanced Western Slavs (the Poles and the Czechs) devolves the fraternal duty of introducing into the European family of nations their so long oppressed and therefore backward Slav brethren the White Russians and the Ukrainians.

This would notably enlarge the buffer regions of Europe on the Bolshevik side; it would supply the highly industrialized nations of Europe with an 'internal colonial' market for their wares; and it would furnish western capital with lucrative opportunities for investment. Besides these obvious advantages, we must likewise remember that the position of Europe in general as a region for agricultural production would be greatly improved; and that there would also be a better chance than there is now for collaboration with Japan, which would find her anti-Bolshevik safeguards thus strengthened.

7. IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN SLAVS TO EUROPE

I am deliberately stressing, not only the need for compensating Poland and Czechoslovakia by the pay-

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ment of substantial reparations which may in some measure make good the injustices they have suffered, but also the fact that these peoples and their States are of the utmost importance to the European community.

Two leading motives are at work here.

First of all, by strengthening the position of the Slavs in Eastern Europe we shall give the less numerous peoples of Western Europe the sense that they have a counterpoise on the other side of the Germans in Central Europe.

Secondly, when insisting upon the indisputable right of the Western Slavs to be enrolled on an equal footing, I desire to point out the gains that will ensue for the economics, the politics, and, not least, the culture of Europe.

As regards the former point, Tomorrow's Germany would be so little afraid of being 'encircled' by Latins and Slavs on the west, south, and east, that she would gladly accept the maintenance of old alliances by France, or the formation of new ones, as advantageous to the European Federation (or to the renovated League of Nations), inasmuch as that would make an end once for all of alarms about possible attempts to establish German hegemony. Since the Latin peoples outnumber the Germans and are stronger, since the Anglo-French alliance will assuredly continue after the war, and since the Western Slavs (more especially if the White Russians and the Ukrainians are freed) will rapidly gain importance and influence in Europe — there would be an admirable equipoise between Latins, Germans, and Slavs, so that any racial predominance in Europe would be excluded.

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As regards what Europe would gain by incorporating the Western Slavs on equal terms, in the long run the cultural advantages would be even greater than the political and economic. This is obvious, and has already been expounded. The most outstanding political gain would be the extinction of Panslavism, a movement no less dangerous to Europe than Pangermanism. For Panslavism gives the Asiatic power of Russia (under the mask of Bolshevism no less than under the mask of Tsarism) an opportunity for interfering in the problems and disputes of Europe. During the last twenty years there have been numerous examples of this.

The cultural gain, finally, cannot be over-estimated. Anyone who has had even a glimpse of the cultural treasures of the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians, will be convinced that the older nations of Europe will find in them fountains of youth whose healing waters are essential to the renaissance of the West.

To those who take such an outlook it will seem that the Bolshevik-induced homelessness of the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Serb Orthodox Churches (like that of the Greek Church, which has also been robbed of its pillars) is an excellent thing for Europe, to which it wholly restores the last of the children that were influenced by Moscow — Byzantium.

CHAPTER FOUR

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

I. A EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR

THE historical demonstration that in the war which began at the close of August 1939 the trigger was pulled by the Hitler System's will-to-power (behind which stood the traditional Prussian imperialism), and by the Bolshevik will-to-power (mainly inspired by the Panslavist tendencies of Tsarism), must be supplemented by an account of the ideological character of the war, which gives it the aspect of a European Civil War.

For the fact is that in every country, throughout Europe, there is a party opposed to the official policy of its own land: in Germany no less than in France; in Finland no less than in Portugal; in Ireland as well as in Rumania. No matter whether this internal opposition is large or small, whether it is evoked and sustained more by Hitlerian propaganda or by Bolshevik ideology, no one can deny that the war is substantially ideological, is a 'war of religions' in which the adversaries are not nations but groups of zealots. This is typical of civil war.

American observers, with the advantage of distance, have plainly discerned this characteristic of the war, comparing it with the American War of Secession, in which political and economic differences were doubtless at work, but which was essentially an ideological war, and for this reason procreated the U.S.A. in its present form.

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The recognition that the war is really a civil war, that it is ideological or almost religious in type, finds expression in the hopes of the peoples and the avowed aims of the belligerents.

Hitherto in this book I have been expounding the hopes and aims of the German people as follows:

Liberation from the dominion of the junkers, the generals, and the great capitalists by the establishment of a socialist and economic order.

Liberation from the dominion of Prussia by a league of the German tribes within the framework of a free Germanic Federation.

As regards the hopes and aims of the whole 'European Party' in this 'Civil War', there remains a third to mention:

The transformation of Europe into a league of free nations.

For centuries the poets and imaginative writers of all the peoples of Europe have been dreaming of this unity, the best thinkers have contributed to the idea, and during the terrible years from 1920 to 1940 the economists have again and again been forced to admit that their plans will remain fruitless so long as 'Europe' does not really exist.

Notable persons, among whom Aristide Briand and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi should be especially mentioned, have made admirable efforts in this direction, achieving important preliminary advances, but the peoples still lag far behind these bold pioneers.

Only of late, in the theoretical disputes that preceded the Civil War, and in the ideological clarifications which it has promoted among all the peoples, have widespread

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aspirations for unity arisen, a knowledge of its importance, a longing for collaboration, and a will to bring it about. The Pangermans' recent and present attempts to achieve the conquest of Europe, with the consequent revival of memories of the earlier attempts of Napoleon and Charles V, have made it clear that no one nation in Europe is strong enough to subjugate all the others and establish a United European Empire modelled on the Roman Empire of old.

The torrents of blood in which the originators of such schemes have been or will be drowned will not have been poured forth in vain, should the peoples of Europe learn thereby that they are all members one of another, not as servants of one nation or one man, but with equal standing as members of one family, as voluntary constituents of a European Federation.

Maybe, so far, in my disquisitions on the need for European unity, I have not sufficiently emphasized the federal idea, which was uncongenial to the centralist trend of the nineteenth century. Noteworthy in itself is the fact that we now speak of a European Federation, and have dropped the term 'Paneuropa'. The federal scheme is equally essential to the successful solution of numerous political, economic, and cultural problems both within the various States of Europe and within Europe itself.

When, therefore, I now proceed to discuss certain practical tasks that will devolve upon the European Federation, they are all to be considered on the provisos of interconnexion, equality of rights, and voluntariness which must be the pillars of every federation.

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2. GUARANTEES OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

Before I begin a sketch of that European Federation, a picture of which must loom in the minds of all the soldiers (whether they are aware of it or not) as the aim of the sacrifices they are making, let me turn back to the practical political question of the guarantees for security upon whose provision will depend fruitful negotiations for the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Between us and this new order stands the war, the extent of whose sacrifices is still uncertain, but whose most immediate aim cannot but be the 'never again' of the attacked nations, which will only enjoy tranquillity when guarantees of material security have been furnished, and only then be ready to discuss far-reaching plans.

For the very reason that New Germany appreciates this psychological attitude and admits it to be justified, and for the very reason that New Germany is assured of the need for permanent collaboration and ardently desires it, New Germany will be perfectly willing to provide the requisite guarantees.

In my account of the prerequisites for an armistice, of the federalization of Germany, of the democratic and socialist reconstruction of Germany within, and of the radical destruction of Prussian militarism which of old has guided Germany's attitude towards her neighbours, I have already expounded the most important of the guarantees that will be given by New Germany.

Even more conspicuous, however, and therefore able to have a greater effect abroad, will be Germany's

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decisive adoption of the principle of equal rights directly peace is signed.

New Germany will agree to the destruction of the Siegfried Line under the supervision of British and French experts while agreeing to the maintenance of the Maginot Line!

New Germany will likewise agree to France's maintaining her present alliances, both during and after the establishment of the European Federation, whereas Germany will promptly denounce her alliance with Italy and Japan. Finally New Germany would be prepared to renounce the ownership of Heligoland, and this would involve a marked increase in the security of the western powers as against Germany.

The status of the Belt and the Sound will urgently need consideration under the same department. Hitler's successful subjugation of Denmark in April 1940 without striking a blow has shown how impracticable it is that the keys of the Baltic should remain 'in the hands of a child'. Whether this question can best be settled by the incorporation of Denmark into the British Empire, or by the establishment of British fortresses in the 'Gibraltar of the Baltic' will be matters for enquiry and negotiation. In one or other of these ways, guarantees would be provided against future attacks by Germany (or Russia), and enhanced protection would be secured by Poland.

But the most decisive guarantee of general security, and the only one which could content all the European peoples, would be a general agreement to disarm.

Apart from the political question of security, we are here concerned with the economic and financial

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argument that unless there is a notable restriction of armaments bankruptcy or impoverishment will be general among the States of Europe. We have merely to imagine what will be the condition of national finance everywhere when the war draws to a close, and we shall see that collapse and pauperization can only be avoided by reducing to a very modest fraction the milliards that have of late been squandered on armaments.

But such a comprehensive reduction will only be possible if there is a general agreement to disarm jointly and simultaneously, the process being subjected to reciprocal control.

The carrying out and the control of disarmament will be the concern of a sub-committee of the Peace Conference. Enough here to say from the German side that within the general staff a number of officers must mutually exercise the control, for experience has shown that effective control must be from within.

The climax of this reciprocal disarmament on the part of the nations of Europe would be the creation of a composite European army.

Its national constituents could be so constituted as to give the European peoples a hundred-per-cent guarantee of security as against one another. Britain, for instance, might supply the aviation contingent; France, the heavy guns and the tanks; Germany, the light artillery and the infantry; Poland, the cavalry; Czechoslovakia, the pioneers. The neutral States, especially Spain and Italy, would for the time being only undertake a systematic reduction of their national armies. The formation of this European army would be an additional and extremely

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important factor of security, and the defensive capacity of Europe as a whole would not be in the least impaired.

3. POLITICAL COLLABORATION

Our earnest desire for a European Federation and our determination to establish it must not blind us to the immense difficulties that will have to be overcome. In my view the chief reason why so little support has been given to any of the plans hitherto mooted has been that they were all designed from a ready-made picture and paid too little heed to extant national institutions — moss-grown with antiquity and deeply rooted.

In contrast to these plans, of which new variants are published almost every day, I myself (true to my conservative principles) start from the conviction that all historical processes need a considerable time to ripen. I am also guided by the general experience that amalgamations had better begin with the minimum, for then we can be sure that as time passes the attachments will become firmer and more numerous.

To every advocate of the notion of a European Federation — which in 1940 must surely include all thoughtful Europeans — can be earnestly commended a study of the British Commonwealth. There we have: a minimum of coercion, a maximum of freedom; due regard for diverging local interests and respect for national susceptibilities; the maintenance of time-honoured institutions, even though they are often inconvenient; the avoidance of undue levelling, and instead a deliberate preservation of national or local manners and customs.

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In a word, the amalgamation is to be made effective without thereby sensibly or visibly altering the previous methods, rules, or ways. Here is the best recipe for the establishment of a European Federation.

To demand at the outset the establishment of a federal government, a federal executive, and the like, would only raise needless difficulties, perhaps amounting to impossibilities. (Once more I say, look at the British Empire.)

At the start, of course, the European Federation can only be a voluntary union of European States, access to which will be open to every European State that complies with the prescribed regulations. It will be advantageous to the Federation to make membership a thing to be coveted by every European State.

Among the conditions of membership will be that the candidate State must be subject to the reign of law, both in home affairs and in foreign relations; it must recognize the arbitral powers of the Federation; must participate in the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague and in the (renovated) League of Nations, and in any international institutions established by these.

The most important feature of the Federation, and at the same time the chief advantage of membership, will be the collective security of the members, as maintained by their reciprocal guarantees and by their mutual pledges to combine in order to resist an attack made from without upon any member of the Federation.

The enormous advantages, alike political, military, and financial, of having a joint armed force are so obvious that the members of the European Federation will establish one sooner or later, even though to begin with

ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

it may take a more traditional form than the one sketched above, having specifically distinct national contingents.

The relations of the European Federation to the League of Nations will be mainly determined by the reconstruction of the latter in the sense of a worldwide representation of continental groups.

4. ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

Much closer (and therefore doubly attractive to outsiders) can be economic collaboration. It is likely to be developed forthwith — and experience teaches that joint economic advantages form the strongest cement for social cohesion.

The gradual abolition of all customs barriers upon free trade; the discontinuance of insistence upon passports and other hindrances to freedom of movement; the systematic cultivation of international economic and financial relations; unified currency systems; the joint performance of mighty schemes — such will be the chief methods of economic collaboration among the States that will be members of the European Federation, and the resulting advantages will be so overwhelming that any sceptical or hesitant outsiders will soon be eager to join.

Collaboration of the national economies within the European Federation will help to guard the members against 'trade crises', an effect that will be strengthened by the unity of labour laws and labour-protection schemes throughout the Federation.

Important contributions thereto will be made by the increasingly unified action of the economic aggregate of

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the European Federation in world-politics and upon the world-market.

Additional possibilities for economic collaboration will be provided by the facilitation of freedom of traffic and trade, the open chances the citizens will have for settling in one another's countries, the assimilation of their respective systems of weights and measures and of coinage, unified customs tariffs as against non-members, a common policy as concerns stocks and shares, and what not.

Of course it is likely enough that there will be varying grades of collaboration among the members, such as have been begun of late between England and France. Here, too, the principle of the utmost flexibility is more important than the principle of the utmost unity.

5. CULTURAL COLLABORATION

The most obvious of all the features of the Federation will be, and should be, the cultural collaboration of its members.

Among the peoples of Europe, which have too long been spellbound by narrow national ideas, it is time to revive an awareness of their historical and cultural association.

Nothing will contribute more to this awakening than a knowledge of the national peculiarities of the various peoples of Europe, for that will make them respect one another, and take pride in the multifariousness of the West, inasmuch as variety is not only the charm of Europe but its very essence.

A noble rivalry of national spirits and national arts,

CULTURAL COLLABORATION

an 'Olympiad of the mind', should be inaugurated to bring together the peoples of the European Federation through regular publications and other suitable arrangements, as a supplement of the physical Olympiad revived at Athens in 1900, and rightly regarded as one of the finest examples of international collaboration.

Appropriate to the cultural collaboration of the members of the European Federation would be that they should manifest their interdependency in their educational systems, and tolerate nothing that might run counter to it. A good thing would be to have a special committee appointed to attend to such matters, and exercise a censorship over schoolbooks. In science, also, there should be close collaboration; and the arts of various countries should fertilize one another, as they could effectively do through the instrumentality of a European Academy.

The increasing importance that is being attached to the work of the Churches would also help to promote awareness of cultural collaboration, for the spirit of Christianity is the most fundamental bond of the unity of the West.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

EVEN within this sketchy account of the Problems of the Peace Conference and of the European Federation it is desirable to consecrate a section to the colonial problem, for the Conference will certainly have to consider the German claim to colonies. Furthermore the treatment of the colonial problem will give a crucial example of the new spirit that will be essential to the establishment of a new order in Germany and in Europe.

Speaking generally, the colonial problem must not be solved, either for Germany or for the other European States which have or desire colonies, in such a way that the limited (and for various reasons dwindling) colonial areas can ever again change masters in consequence of an intra-European war.

There must be an entirely new attitude towards this problem, and that will entail a new solution.

The first essential is to recognize that nowadays the colonial problem is mainly a problem of raw materials. Subordinate to this are such questions as that of economics, settlement, fields for investment, etc. Last of all come questions of prestige and national security.

Such a view of the colonial problem will steadily gain ground with the establishment of a new political and economic order in Europe, and the consequent growing solidarity of the European peoples.

New Germany, for instance, will not claim that she

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has more right to colonies than other States, such as Poland or Czechoslovakia. The arguments that Germany might advance on behalf of being put in possession of colonies might be advanced with equal force by other European countries that have no colonies.

Inasmuch as a perennial struggle for colonies (whose size and lucrativeness cannot be indefinitely magnified) must be rendered impossible, a new sort of solution must be found, and this is that certain regions of Africa shall be jointly administered by the European States which hitherto have had no colonies.

To avert the suspicion that such a formulation may be a cloak for a predatory campaign on the part of the 'have-nots' against the 'haves', and also to facilitate the acceptance of the scheme, it must be clearly understood at the outset that England, France, Italy, and Spain — the chief colonial powers of Europe — will deliberately stand aside as possible beneficiaries. (The same consideration applies to the non-African colonies of the other European powers.)

Thus the scheme would apply to the former German colonies in Africa and to the African possessions of Belgium and Portugal. These large, valuable, and still for the most part undeveloped, areas would be placed under the joint administration of all the European powers, with the exception of the four great colonial powers previously named.

With this end in view, the European States other than those purposely excluded would jointly form a 'European Colonial Company' (E.C.C.) to which each State would subscribe funds proportional to the number of its inhabitants. Investments, administrative posts, and possi-

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bilities of settlement would be allotted pro rata to the various States that had formed the E.C.C., subject to adjustment every decade in accordance with the census returns of the nations concerned. Any national quota not taken up would be open to the public on loan, but here also subject to decennial revision and recall.

The European Colonial Company would pledge itself to respect the rights of the previous owners or mandataries of the regions it would take over.

To the previous owners or mandataries must, above all, be assigned a ninety-nine year right to the returns on the basis of the average yield of the last ten years. Furthermore the E.C.C. would guarantee the maintenance of existing material and personal rights, especially the tenure of their posts by extant officials, military officers, and subordinate soldiers — for life or while fit for service, previous rights to pensions, etc., being scrupulously preserved. The appointment of new officials would only be made as needed, once more pro rata. Military officers and subordinate soldiers would be appointed as vacancies arose, but there would be no increase in the staffs as they existed on December 31, 1938.

The E.C.C. would also guarantee that the flags that had flown over the respective territories should continue to fly there, but would have the right of hoisting its own flag beside the other; it would continue to use whatever had been the official language in any locality, but with the right to use a second official language as well, should this be expedient anywhere for administrative purposes. Thus all the administrations would be placed on an equal footing.

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Future officials and settlers would attend, to begin with, a course of study in colonial schools to be set up in the respective countries of Europe, and the teaching in these would be unified as far as possible.

The E.C.C. would lay especial stress upon the advancement of the indigenes of the colonies, regarding itself as their guardian; and when the natives developed they would, as far as possible, be associated in the work of administration.

The E.C.C. would endeavour to make with the great colonial powers agreements that would be to their mutual advantage. The great colonial powers would also be entitled to join with the E.C.C. in the furtherance of all or some of the latter's possessions.

New Germany would be prepared to assign unconditionally to the E.C.C. all its own colonial rights, even its most recent ones, for it would regard the formation of this body as a just and generally satisfactory solution.

It seems important to point out that the joint cultivation of interests within the E.C.C. would have favourable repercussions upon the political collaboration of the various States; and that the great civilizing work that would be associated with the effective opening-up of Africa would give a powerful impetus to economics and science — and be most beneficial to the youths of Europe. Having great duties to perform makes people young, vigorous, and cheerful. That is what Europe needs.

CHAPTER SIX

WAR AIMS

SUMMARIZING the ideas hitherto expounded, we can make the following list of war aims:

- (1) Overthrow of Hitler and Hitlerism.
- (2) Annihilation of Prussian power politics by the federalization of Germany.
- (3) Restoration of liberty to the Czechoslovaks and the Poles.
- (4) Reparations to be paid by Germany to the Poles and the Czechoslovaks.
- (5) Right of self-determination for the inhabitants of Austria, Sudetenland, and the Danzig region.
- (6) The safeguarding of France by the destruction of the Siegfried line while the Maginot line remains intact.
- (7) Joint defence against the Bolshevik peril.
- (8) General disarmament under reciprocal control.
- (9) Expansion of the Anglo-French economic alliance into an economic collaboration of Europe at large.
- (10) The establishment of a European Federation within the framework of a renovated League of Nations.

The foregoing 'Peace Aims of New Germany' are primarily dedicated to the German people, which less than any other is in a position to grasp the nature and meaning of this war, or to understand its outbreak and its course. Seven years of propaganda have clouded the minds of Germans within the Reich; seven years of the

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Hitlerian Reign of Terror have in part intimidated them and in part coarsened them. Nevertheless I am sure that the feelings and thoughts of the German people will endorse these Peace Aims; and that the German people wants to take part in the upbuilding of a New Europe which it longs for no less ardently than do the peoples of other lands.

The latter should be convinced by these proposals that Tomorrow's Germany will be ready to give the requisite moral and material guarantees to show the eagerness of the German people to be incorporated in New Europe.

I know that the dead of the war of 1914-1918 and the dead of the war of 1940- bequeath as their supreme legacy:

the upbuilding of a New Europe.